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Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply
them . . . We do not turn a matter over to a judge because we want his
view about what the best idea is or what the best solution is. It is because
we want him or her to apply the law. Judges are constrained when they
apply the law. They are constrained by the words that Congress chooses
to enact into law when interpreting the law. They are constrained by the
words of the Constitution. They are constrained by the precedents of
other judges that become part of the rule of law that they must apply . . .
people on both sides need to realize that the Supreme Court will handle
cases on a level playing field—the justices are going to interpret the law
and apply the Constitution without taking sides in the dispute.1
A ritual is enacted whenever a nominee for a federal judgeship
appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee as part of the
confirmation process. One Senator will ask, “Do you intend to apply the
law rather than make it?” Another will ask, “Will you apply the words of
the Constitution in the way that the framers intended?” Nominees, some
of whom ought to know better, play their part in the ritual by answering
“Yes” to both questions. Sometimes this ritual provides the opportunity
1
ROBERTS, J., C.J., Sept. 12–15, 2005, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Comm.
rpc.senate.gov/_files/Sept2005RobertsSD.pdf (last viewed Dec. 3, 2007). For remarks by
current and former Republican presidential nominees that echo this statement, see
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120226814194646733.html?mod=opinion_journal_feder
ation (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). (Sen. John McCain: “I will nominate judges who
understand that their role is to faithfully apply the law as written, not impose their
opinions through judicial fiat.”; former Gov. Mike Huckabee: “I firmly believe that the
Constitution must be interpreted according to its original meaning, and flatly reject the
notion of a “living Constitution”; Rep. Ron Paul: “Judicial activism, after all, is the
practice of judges ignoring the law and deciding cases based on their personal political
views.”).
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for a degradation ceremony, in which the subject may be made to debase
himself or herself as a prerequisite to a transition into the new status.
More often, it allows the nominee to engage in anticipatory socialization
by behaving before the Committee as he or she will behave on the bench.
But like most rituals, this one is important primarily because it reveals to
us some of the deep assumptions prevalent in the culture.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is
the power of the judiciary to say what the law is.”3 From such reasoning,
courts exercise great power when interpreting statutes, constitutions, and
prior cases. New lawyers are chiefly trained by examining decisions
from appellate courts. Yet what do we lawyers know of the structural
limits of those appellate courts,4 and of group decision-making? This
Article aims to define the capacity and limits of appellate courts in order
to challenge positions regarding the Rule of Law. The Article argues that
appellate courts are limited during the creation of any legal
interpretation.
Consider the first introductory passage as well as the following:
John Paul Stevens: “‘It seems to me that one of the overriding
principles in running the country is the government ought to be
neutral. . . . It has a very strong obligation to be impartial, and not
use its power to advance political agendas or personal agendas.”5
Robert Bork: “The judge’s authority derives entirely from the
fact that he is applying6 the law and not his personal values. That
is why the American public accepts the decisions of its courts,

2
Tushnet, M., Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
3
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4
In the words of Justice Scalia, I will focus on the “science of interpretation.”
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3
(Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University Press 1997).
5
Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50
(quoting Justice Stevens on legal thinking and the judicial role). The critical issue is
exactly what it means to be “neutral.” This Article suggests that neutrality is a subjective
determination, irreconcilable with an objective rule of law. Appellate courts cannot
objectively apply neutrality.
6
To apply: 1 a: to put to use especially for some practical purpose <applies pressure
to get what he wants> b: to bring into action <apply the brakes> c: to lay or spread on
<apply varnish> d: to put into operation or effect <apply a law>. http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/apply (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
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accepts even decisions that nullify the laws a majority of the
electorate or of their representatives voted for.”7
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: “Federal judges, whether appointed by
Republican or Democratic Presidents, generally endeavor to
administer justice impartially and to interpret laws reasonably
and sensibly, with due restraint and fidelity to precedent . . .
Proper judicial action is to use best efforts to ‘adjudicate cases
fairly.’”8

Despite these comments, how do contemporary courts (1) make law
neutrally, (2) apply the law instead of personal values, and (3) show
fidelity to precedent in order to administer justice impartially? Each idea
(neutrality, application of laws, and objective fidelity to precedent) is
impossible; such statements are hortatory signals that can only be served
within bounds of “reasonableness” and “political morality.”9 The
statements above all assume that some degree of objectivity exists to
support appellate court legitimacy. These assumptions are incorrect.
Personal agendas are formed from subjective preferences, including
political preferences that are the source of what this Article calls the
judiciary’s “cardinal bargains.” Cardinal bargains are imperative
compromises by judges that allow the formation of interpretation.
Without such compromises, it would be mathematically impossible for
the courts to produce majority opinions unless, at times, the adjudication
was the result of the minority producing the outcome.
Due to this mathematical severity, this Article concludes that the
Rule of Law, unlike scientific truths, cannot be derived from any
independent and objective source. This supposition informs our
understanding of what the Rule of Law can and cannot be. The Article
applies this conclusion to appellate court theory. Specifically, it finds that
the prominent theories offered to support the legitimacy of appellate
courts, as well as inferences of “objectivity” that legitimize stare decisis,
are flawed.

7
THE BORK HEARINGS 3 (Ralph E. Shaffer ed., Marcus Wiener Publishers (2005))
(quoting Judge Bork, emphasis added). Judge Bork later said: “[T]o discuss my general
approach to stare decisis and the kind of factors I would consider. . . . [There is a] need
for continuity and stability in the law. . . . I think the preservation of confidence in the
Court [is maintained] by not saying that this crowd just does whatever they feel like as
the personnel changes.” Id. at 60–61.
8
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal
Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
9
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
127 (Amy Gutmann ed,, Princeton University Press 1997). This concept is discussed by
Ronald Dworkin.
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Considering the larger implication, in appellate bodies the
seemingly valid idea (if not a wholly assumed idea) that judges should
“apply” the laws is, in fact, void. The fault is not in the declarer’s
purpose, nor in some suspicious and untrustworthy battle among furtive
and polar political philosophers conspiring against each other. Instead,
the problem is inherent in the assumption that a body composed of
equally weighted voices can lift itself above the fray of battling
jurisprudential theories and apply the one “true” Rule of Law. This
cannot occur at an appellate court, and social choice illustrates why it
cannot.
Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem” is a mathematical proof
that examines group decision-making. These group decisions may result
in legislation, in an appellate court opinion, or any other decision where
each member of the group has an equal vote. From certain seemingly
palatable and purportedly necessary axioms, Arrow showed that conflict
exists and even perfect cooperation among members of any group fails.
Group decision-making processes fail because the standards proposed as
ethically and politically “fair” are incompatible with one another.
Importantly, Arrow’s proof does not merely provide an insight for
expectations of all group decisions. Rather, it can be used to understand
why some jurisprudential methods are “positively” unworkable.10 These
interpretive methods fail when they assume appellate adjudication does
not depend on individual judges’ subjective authority to bargain over the
law. Arrow’s Proof commands that judges use a subjective power. This
poses problems for the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation presented
in the “liberal project.”11 That is, though jurisprudence scholars offer
restrictions on judicial power through interpretivism (such as

10
Unlike ideas in law and economics that may attempt to show what is “good” or
“bad” normatively, Arrow’s proof is a “positive” limit on the possible. This enables the
potential examination to be largely free of political leaning, which creates a firmer
foundation for later discussions of the potential normative roles of judges and the Rule of
Law. I thus use the term “positive” to signify the irrelevance of any relative or
comparative ideas, and instead focus attention on the absolute.
11
The term “liberal project” refers to a movement that attempts to satisfy the
jurisprudential theoretical need of consistency, as well as the idea that all individuals’
subjective preferences are to a large degree, if not completely, equally valid. For a
description of this “liberal individualism,” as well as a description of the jurisprudential
efforts to satisfy this ideal, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783–786
(1983). For further views on the tension between political science and this liberal project,
see generally Perry, M., A Critique of the “Liberal” Political-Philosophical Project, 28
WM. & MARY L. REV. 205 (1987); Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law,
11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435 (1999) (examining the tension between liberal political
theory and the law and why concepts of justice and law may be intertwined).
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intentionalism) or neutral principles,12 these proposals ultimately fail.
This article argues that several scholars incorrectly applied the Arrow
proof to the judicial-legislative relationship. It then offers a correct
examination of the judiciary in light of Arrow’s proof.
Chiefly, the Article examines an intentionalist perspective of
“applying” the law. However, the analysis applies to any version of
statutory interpretation that suggests legitimacy through purported
consistency. Regarding intentionalism, the Article suggests that while a
legislature certainly creates statutes and perhaps possesses “legislative
intent,”13 the judiciary’s corresponding analysis of statutes, cases, and
constitutions involves power. This power is the use of individuals’
intensity-preferences by multi-member panels. Individuals bargain in a
“cardinal,” and not “ordinal” manner.14 This means appellate judges use
their individual convictions to bargain among subjective determinations
of the importance of various principles. If they do not do this, the
decision-making process will fail, because another critical Arrovian
assumption must be broken, or “relaxed.” If an improper Arrovian
assumption is relaxed, the result is an incoherent decision-making
process.15 If judges do use subjective preferences to decide cases, a group
decision is permissible. However, the Article will show that this implies
the law-reader is the law-giver, and inappropriately conflicts with the

12
“Neutral principles” was a proposal by Wechsler as an alternative version of
jurisprudence that would limit politics from encroaching on the judiciary. See Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959);
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 77–78, Harvard University Press (1995). But see
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (criticizing neutral principles).
13
That legislative intent may exist is an assumption in this Article; the veracity of
this assumption, as well as how to find it, is irrelevant to the proof’s application in this
Article.
14
“Cardinal” numbering refers to a numerical quantity rather than an order (e.g., the
Orioles have “five” runs more than the Red Sox). The opposite of this is “ordinal”
numbering, which refers to a specific position in a series (e.g., that was the “fifth” home
run of the game).
15
One may question, “Aren’t judicial opinions simply incoherent? Isn’t this exactly
what happens?” When the Article says “incoherent,” it means, for example, that an
appellate court outcome of four to five occurred, but the four votes provide the holding.
Better yet, imagine one vote providing the holding instead of eight contrary and
homogeneous votes. “Incoherence” here is not to say that precedents will not be
inconsistent with each other in appellate law. The incoherency to which I refer above is
the intractable and irrational outcome of a “loser” position beating a “winner” position as
we do not expect according to majority rule. Further, just when majority rule would “fail”
is not predictable, adding to what I call “incoherence.” The problem is dramatic and
pervasive in that one single decision’s logical consistency is ruined. In sum, the problem
in relaxing the wrong Arrovian assumption is a single decision makes no sense—not that
the adjudicated precedents are inconsistent.
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objective idea of “ascertaining” and “applying” the one true and
objective Rule of Law.16
Part II provides an intuitive understanding of Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem. Kenneth Arrow proved that if a collective decision-making
process could successfully implement the four characteristics of
“Universal Range,” “Transitivity,” “Pareto,” and an “Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives,” then a fifth characteristic, the existence of a
“dictator,” must exist as well.17
In lay terms, Arrow simply analyzed decision-making. He
developed assumptions about how a fair decision-making system should
work, resulting in the most benefits for all. He formulated a proof about
group choices resulting from assumptions that seem based on fairly weak
constraints.18 The proof is powerful because it proves that cooperation
itself is rigidly limited. Cooperation is limited irrespective of the
presence of relevant extremes among the group’s political or subjective
preferences. Part II presents an intuitive understanding of this proof.
In Part III, the Article examines the relationship between the
judiciary and the legislature in light of Arrow’s Theorem. It reviews
several theories of jurisprudence including textualism, intentionalism,
pragmatism and Dworkinism. The focus is on the jurisprudential
legitimacy of intentionalism, and the debate about whether it is possible
to aggregate individual preferences into a coherent “legislative intent.”
16

Tushnet, supra note 2, at 781–82 (citing the “degradation ceremony” of nominees
being scolded by senators to “apply” the law).
17
Kenneth Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POLITICAL
ECON. 328 (1950). Arrow won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1972. These
characteristics mean something specific in public choice economics, which is defined
more technically in Part II. Briefly, “universal range” refers to the existence of more than
two choices for any group decision (for example, a choice between chocolate, vanilla, or
strawberry). The “transitivity” characteristic means that if chocolate ice cream is
preferred to vanilla (abbreviated as chocolate ‘P’ vanilla), and vanilla is preferred to
strawberry (again, vanilla ‘P’ strawberry), then chocolate also (due to the transitive
property), is preferred to strawberry (chocolate ‘P’ strawberry). The “Pareto principle”
(for these limited purposes) states that if a group universally decides one outcome is
“best,” then the group prefers that choice, as well. “Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives” means two things: (1) if a group prefers chocolate over vanilla, adding in a
choice strawberry is not allowed to affect the choice between the first two; and (2) all
choices are made through ordinal preference rankings (i.e., first choice, second choice,
third choice, etc.), rather than a cardinal “points” system (e.g., “I vote that chocolate gets
seven points, vanilla gets two, and strawberry gets one.”). “Dictatorship” means that
every possible outcome in a group’s decision, when examined ex ante, coincides
perfectly with one single person’s desires, even in the face of contrary majorities. The
term “dictator” does not connote either benevolence or existence of a despot. The term is
thus “value free.” Paul Hansen, Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem, 33 J. ECON. EDUC. 217, 220 (2002).
18
Arrow, supra note 17.
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After a brief review of Gerald MacCallum’s legislative intent theories,19
this Article concludes that Arrow’s Theorem does not preclude the
finding of legislative intent. This is important because it allows appellate
bodies to operate without legislative interference. That is, if appellate
courts are somehow structurally limited in adjudicating cases, it is not
necessarily due to a structural consequence of the legislature’s incapacity
to form an “intent.”
Thus, Arrow’s Theorem is irrelevant to legislative decisions
because legislatures do not need to retain Arrow’s Independence
criterion. This Independence criterion proves critical. Put plainly, there
are no normative restrictions on the legislature. The legislature is thus
freed from a dooming application of Arrow’s Proof. As a political
branch, it may draw arbitrary lines or perhaps make no decision at all on
an issue for any reason. Since Arrow’s Theorem does not disprove the
existence of legislative intent due to contradictions between the proof
and the legislative mechanism, the Article next discusses jurisprudential
coordination theories between the legislature and the judiciary. This step
demonstrates why appellate courts themselves hold a structural
constraint. The constraint is that the courts create meanings from
subjective preferences when they interpret and adjudicate.
Part IV examines multi-member appellate court decisions in light of
Arrow’s Theorem. Then Professor, now Judge Easterbrook analyzed this
specific issue. Easterbrook concluded that Arrow’s Theorem demands
appellate courts inevitably create inconsistent opinions.20 His argument
indicates that inconsistency is inevitable because all Arrovian conditions
except for “Transitivity” are necessary in the appellate decision-making
process.
This Article concludes that it is Arrow’s “Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives” assumption that must give way to the other four
criteria. The same solution exists with the legislature. In the judiciary,
however, there are consequences that impact our understanding of
appellate court functions and jurisprudence as a whole. The Article first
explains why Independence must be “relaxed,” instead of any of the
other four characteristics. It then discusses why “relaxing Independence”
correlates with the liberal project’s failed attempt to defend an objective
Rule of Law within appellate courts. The defense fails because the Rule
19

Gerald C. MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 755–59 (1965). Just
how the judicial mind determines this intent is not necessary in this Article; the proof that
this intent is impossible to ascertain does not require an explanation of how the intent is
determined.
20
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1982).
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of Law must be created by subjective determinations, case by case,
where judges “bargain” over the importance of theoretical
underpinnings. Alternative jurisprudential theories that may not be clear
victors are never “irrelevant,” so subjective preferences among myriad
theories must control the bargaining. This conclusion reinforces the
impossibility of the liberal project’s idea of an objective Rule of Law
because collective bodies of judges simply cannot, by any method,
collectively ascertain and apply any objective mechanism when
interpreting the law.
The Article shows that every appellate decision requires individual
judges to: (1) make subjective decisions about what the law should be;
and (2) bargain among the panel of judges using subjective perceptions
of the desirability of different interpretations. Because judges are not
“applying the law,” but inventing the interpretation of the law through
communal debate, the liberal project’s rule of law must fail. Rather, the
law exists, as created by judges, specifically because the law is what a
judge subjectively says it is. In contrast to the legislature, many—
including appellate judges themselves—state the legitimizing premise of
the judge’s role is the existence of an objective fixture such as the Rule
of Law, or perhaps “neutrality,” which judges “apply” to existing law
rather than create new law. Arrow’s Theorem proves that such a design
flounders. Instead, personal convictions and subjective intensity
preferences are the necessary ingredients in appellate judgments. If not
for these preferences, the group decision would violate Arrow’s Proof.
This Article demonstrates how such incoherence is avoided.
However, the logic appears to leave a discrepancy. The liberal
project purports to uphold the Rule of Law for legitimacy in
government.21 The remaining issue is whether a saving theory is needed
or available for appellate courts. Since judges in appellate courts must
21

Reasons offered for the desire of objectivity in the Rule of Law include: “cultural
heterogeneity,” ethical fears of despotism/dictatorship, cultural fears of
oligarchy/monarchy, and a deep belief in “checks and balances.” Dean Carrington
suggested legal nihilism results in professional incompetence and a fear that only
“cunning” survives in a society where might makes right. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law
and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984). Carrington stated, “The law . . . is a
mere hope that people who apply the lash of power will seek to obey the law’s
command.” Id. at 226. Carrington believed that officials, including judges, could
inappropriately use power to pursue social and political agendas not embodied in the
law.” Id. (emphasis added). This Articles disputes the last point by arguing that the power
to pursue political agendas is part of judicial bargains. Judge/Dean/Professor Calabresi’s
response is “[t]he role of the scholar is to look in dark places and to shed light on what he
or she sees there . . . . [I]f in all honesty what the scholar sees seems false, then the
scholar must declare it to be false even if that opens him or her up to the charge of
nihilism.” Guido Calabresi et al., Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1,
23 (1985).
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bargain cardinally, thus wielding power, the question becomes, what
limitations are on judicial interpretations of the law that satisfy the
objective “purist” as well as stare decisis theory?
Part V examines the argument that controls exist to partially
restrain the unadulterated use of individual power. The Article concludes
that legal ethics, the political approval processes, and self-imposed
restrictions (including the judicial standing doctrine, stare decisis, or
other judicially manufactured restrictions such as Chevron deference22)
fail to control subjective preferences. These controls are ineffective for
the same reason that interpretive theory such as intentionalism fails. The
only “solution” is for society to have proper expectations of appellate
power: reasonableness and political morality are the subjective and
vague resources that judges “apply.” The most effective understanding
accepts that the courts are well placed for adjudication and finality only,
and that theoretical objectivity demands the impossible. Even by limiting
jurisdiction under “standing” or Chevron doctrines, for example,
appellate bodies muster a subjective power to compromise and then
create limitations on when to use such tools.
The structure of appellate courts is thus one where, although we
may assume they should be regulated to relinquish power, no objective
law, ex ante, will function objectively. Judges, politicians, and the public
should understand this fundament of appellate courts. Institutional
arrangements may attempt to achieve society’s ends of providing
fruitful—if bargained for—decisions, but they never truly temper and
constrain appellate judges’ powers. The power and potential of the court
is truly in the subjective assessments that judges act on.
The Article concludes with a brief examination of stare decisis
theory, and explores the reasons why judges might earnestly attempt to
restrict themselves to previous subjective bargains.
II. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:
HANSEN’S GRAPHICAL EXPLANATION
A. Arrow’s Theorem
While attempting to derive critical characteristics of a social
welfare function,23 Kenneth Arrow uncovered a characteristic of

22

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The search for a social welfare function is an attempt to aggregate preferences in
society, allocate commodities to maximize society’s welfare, and in general, provide the
maximum amount of utility for all. Currently, this cannot be done. See DENNIS CARY
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 582 (3d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
23
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cooperative decision-making theory.24 Arrow’s five axioms show that
any group, be it a city council, a legislature, or a multimember court
behaving at its collective “best,” are limited if it chooses to apply itself in
the Arrovian scheme. Specifically, Arrow found that no group can
cooperate while staying true to four Arrovian assumptions unless there is
a “dictator.” This shows that an inherent structural limitation exists in
any group decision that attempts to abide by the five assumptions.
Arrow’s five assumptions about decision-making are:
(1) The Pareto principle (Pareto): If an individual’s preference is
unopposed by any contrary preference of another, the
individual’s preference is preserved in the social preference
ordering outcome. That is, the outcome of the votes must retain
that universal characteristic. For example, where three
individuals’ three choices align perfectly (xyz, xyz, and xyz), the
outcome will align with those preferences (i.e., the outcome
cannot be anything other than xyz). However, if even one
individual of three chose an alternative such as zyx, Pareto does
not apply at all.
(2) Non-dictatorship: No individual enjoys a position so that
among his preferences between any two alternatives, and all
others’ preferences expressing the opposite, his preferences are
always preserved in the social ordering. (For example, if there are
two votes for xyz, and one vote for zyx, if the decision-making
process allowed all of the latter’s preferences, including zyx to
“win” as society’s preferred outcome, this would violate the Nondictatorship characteristic).
(3) Transitivity (and Completeness):25 The decision-making
process gives a consistent ordering of all potential outcomes. (For
example, if everyone agreed that aPb, and bPc, then we must
conclude that aPc). Importantly, this assumption demands an
output answer will be provided for every possibility.
(4) Range: Some universal alternative exists such that for every
pair of alternatives, each possible ordering of those two, plus at
least a third option (or more), is an admissible ranking of all
24

Arrow, supra note 17.
“Completeness” is assumed as necessary to transitivity, and states that a decision
must be made for every outcome. DENNIS CARY MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 582, 586
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2003). In part, this occurs because ranking is ordinal in
the theorem, thus no “ties” may be offered by individuals. For example, one may rank
choices as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, but not 1st and two ties for 2nd. Parts IV and V show how
completeness is necessary in the search for objectivity in jurisprudence.
25
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alternatives for the individual. (In the simplest terms, this
characteristic means there are always at least three (3) choices for
the group to consider.)
(5) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (“IIA” or
“Independence”): The social choice between any two alternatives
depends only on the orderings that individuals make over those
two alternatives and not on orderings over other alternatives.26
For example, if three individuals prefer x to y (“xPy”), the
addition of a third choice, z, cannot change the x versus y
decision. This will be the most important characteristic to
understand when applying the proof to jurisprudence. It is also
the most difficult to understand. To restate this characteristic: any
value judgment imposed by a social choice rule to resolve one
particular preference conflict must hold for all other profiles. The
key to understanding this characteristic will include a discussion
of the difference between “ordinal” and “cardinal” ordering. This
is discussed more in depth in Hansen’s illustration below, as it
may be the best way to truly grasp the enormous consequences of
this characteristic.

The proof in next discussed in two parts. First, the Article
introduces Hansen’s graphical illustration of Arrow’s Proof, which
analyzes two persons making a decision among three choices. Then the
Article shows why, even for group decisions of greater than two persons
(perhaps in the millions or greater), intuition must be employed at the
core of the proof for the decision among two persons.
i. Hansen’s Graphical Proof:
Between Two Individuals, One is a Dictator
Paul Hansen developed a graphical proof of Arrow’s Theorem as an
educational tool using an example of two individuals making a
decision.27 The individuals will be referred to as “Marshall” and
“Taney.”28 Due to the Range requirement summarized above, assume
Marshall and Taney are choosing their preferred outcomes among three
possibilities: x, y, and z.29 Combinatorial math proves that if two persons
26
Id. at 583–84, (publishing the proof of William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and
Social Decision Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507 (Nov. 1960)).
27
Paul Hansen, Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 33 J.
ECON. EDUC. 217, 218 (June 2002).
28
Foils adopted from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
29
Range means that there must be at least three choices, but there may be more. For
simplicity’s sake, this Article uses three, as it is the simplest number of choices which
still conforms to the Range assumption.
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must choose among three preferences, there are thirty-six possible
combinations of choices between Marshall and Taney.30 We may
randomly list the combinations, but for simplicity’s sake we will make
“Profile 1” consists of: Marshall choosing (xyz), and Taney choosing
(xyz).31 Profile 2 consists of: {Marshall (yzx), Taney (yzx)}.32 This
process is then completed (with no need for any particular ordering as
long as all possible combinations are included) for all thirty-six
“profiles.” The graphical “grid” approach provides a simplified
reference.33
Hansen offers a grid illustration of the choices with thirty-six “3 by
3” boxes, two of which are shown in Figure 1, below. Again, there is no
demand that any exact “profile” be called the “first” except that this
figure is the simplest to understand. In “Profile 1,” Marshall ordinally
ranks the three choices of x, y, and z in the following way: x is 1st, y is
2nd, and z is 3rd. Keeping the variables alphabetical, Taney chooses the
exact same preferences: x is 1st, y is 2nd, and z is 3rd.

Figure 1
In the “Profile 7” illustration, Marshall makes the same choices as
in Profile 1: x is 1st, y is 2nd, and z is 3rd. Taney, while coincidentally
choosing x as the 1st preference, differs on the remaining choices: Taney
chooses z as 2nd, and y as 3rd.34
Figure 2, below, details the complete list of “boxes.” Again, the
thirty-six profiles correspond to all possible outcomes for a decision
made between Marshall’s and Taney’s ordinally-ranked preferences
30
31
32
33
34

Combinatorial math would use the following equation: 3! x 3! = 36 profiles.
See Figure 1.
See Figure 2.
Id.
See Figure 1.
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among choices x, y, and z. The important matter is determining outcomes
for all thirty-six potential preference profiles.35 To complete this next
task, the Article applies the five Arrovian assumptions and examines the
consequences.
First, Range is satisfied in all thirty-six profiles because at least
three choices exist in this universe. Second, assume that Non-dictatorship
exists. Soon, it becomes apparent that Non-dictatorship is the proof’s
“punch-line”—it must exist due to the remaining constraints of
Transitivity, Independence, and Pareto. Profile 1 can be used to
demonstrate the impact of the Transitivity, Independence, and Pareto
constraints.
In Profile 1, determining the outcome is simple because the work is
done due to the Pareto principle. The Pareto principle mandates ranking x
as the unanimous first preference, y as the unanimous second, and z as
the unanimous third preference. Applying this to the grid, there is no
dispute whatsoever between Marshall and Taney. The final ordering of
xyz is thus the actual outcome, should these be the actual choices made
by both Marshall and Taney. The potential result is thus determined ex
ante, i.e., before an actual vote has taken place. That is, if the actual
preferences of Marshall and Taney are known, one could determine the
outcome of the vote for Profile 1 before the group’s decision is made.
Superscripts attached to the unanimous preferences in the boxes are
a reminder of the unanimous outcome, and the successful outcome for
Profile 1 is x1y2z3. In profiles 2 through 6 of Figure 2, all possible choices
are ranked for Marshall and Taney. Again, these are the “outcomes” if,
and only if, Marshall and Taney actually make the decisions represented
in that respective profile.
The outcomes for the possible decision-scenarios made by these
two can be determined until Profile 7. At that profile, there is a problem:
Marshall and Taney disagree on a final outcome of z versus y.36 Both
agree that x is first, so that characteristic of the outcome is settled due to
Pareto. However, it must be determined whether y or z should be second
in the final outcome, as well as which choice should be third. Since the
decision function demands an output due to a Completeness
assumption,37 an arbitrary choice is made between these two individuals.
35

Consider this example parallel to choosing the victor among three politicians or
which of three flavors of ice cream the two will eat, etc.
36
The key to grasping the intuition in Hansen’s proof is the depiction of two letters
southwest-northeast of each other (i.e., ** ) which shows agreement, while northwestsoutheast (i.e., **) shows disagreement. This visual depiction is useful in easily finding
disagreements between Marshall and Taney. Resolution of the disagreements determines
who will inevitably be the dictator.
37
Completeness is a characteristic inherent in the transitivity principle.
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If Profile 7’s output is x1y2z3, Marshall’s ranking “wins.” Taney may
“win” just as rightfully, but a successful outcome for Profile 7 is
obtained when Marshall is chosen. But there are consequences—this
arbitrary choice now affects other profiles due to the assumptions of
Transitivity, Pareto, and, most importantly, the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.38
According to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
assumption, any value judgment imposed by the social choice rule to
resolve one particular preference conflict must hold for all other profiles.
Consider a profile disagreement visually depicted in two-dimensional
space as yz. That depiction means Marshall prefers y to z, and Taney the
opposite. If yz is resolved as yPz in the outcome for any one preference
profile, all yz tensions must resolve as yPz in remaining profiles.39 The
third choice, x, may be placed before, after, or even between these two
choices. Choice x’s position depends on Marshall’s and Taney’s full
range of preferences. Regardless, Independence has made its demand:
the result of the yz tension holds true for all profiles where this particular
disagreement exists. The outcome yPz must be kept intact for all profiles
when that exact tension occurs. This demonstrates the “Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives” restriction at work.
The “Independence” assumption is not the only critical restriction.
The transitive property makes demands as well. In Profile 9 of Figure 2,
the yz tension (yPz) exists along with a universally accepted zPx. The yPz
determination (made due to “Independence” and Profile 7’s arbitrary
choice among y and z) forces transitivity to demand the ultimate outcome
yPzPx (or y1z2x3) for this profile.40

38

This arbitrary choice may be made in Profile 7 or any other profile that contains a
disagreement. The Independence assumption will still force the outcome to “trickledown” through other profiles.
39
This yz tension is resolved yPz no matter whether choice x comes “between” y or z,
or universally before, or after, y and z.
40
Hansen explains:
“In Profile 7 . . . although [Marshall and Taney] agree that x comes first, (and
therefore by the Pareto principle, it must head Profile 7’s social ordering), they
disagree in their second and third placings of y and z. Recall, the only
information available is the individuals’ rankings of alternatives and not the
strengths of their preferences [this would be cardinal]. Suppose (arbitrarily) that
[Marshall] is favored so that [his] preference yz prevails and y is socially
ranked ahead of z, and hence Profile 7’s social ordering is determined as xyz
(given x is first via Pareto). The key issue henceforth is the application of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption introduced in the
previous section.”
Paul Hansen, Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 33 J. ECON.
EDUC. 217, 221–22 (June 2002).
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Throughout this process, a single arbitrary decision in Profile 7
“trickles-down” in all thirty-six preference profiles. One might compare
this analysis of the outcomes to the popular Sudoku game, where very
few arbitrary decisions lead to a complete solution for the entire puzzle.
Yet here, only one arbitrary decision is required for a determination of
the entire puzzle. The key is the severity of the four assumptions of
Range, Transitivity, Pareto, and particularly Independence. After
working through the disagreements, the algorithm provides results as
stated below each profile.41
With all of the boxes filled in, an examination reveals that,
coincidentally, all of Marshall’s preferences exactly match the output
function results. This occurred because of the influence from the four
assumptions of Pareto, Range, Transitivity, Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, plus one arbitrary decision. That single arbitrary decision
could have been made among any tension, and would similarly have
“trickled down” through the demands the four assumptions made on the
outcomes in other profiles.42 The key to the inter-profile demands is the
Independence assumption. In the end, Marshall is the “Arrovian
dictator.”43
Consequently, Non-dictatorship is violated, arbitrariness exists (if
not thrives), and majority rule will certainly fail, albeit at unpredictable
times. Political and ethical norms preclude these characteristics in a
voting mechanism. Thus, the concept becomes Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem.44

41

See Figure 2.
For example, one could have chosen Taney’s preferences over Marshall’s in
Profile 7 and the consequence would be the same.
43
“In general, therefore, when a value judgment that corresponds to neither
individual’s ranking is initially imposed (thereby immediately ruling out a dictatorship),
it is impossible to socially order all thirty-six preference profiles because of an inevitable
intransitivity.” Hansen, supra note 27, at 230. Notably, Taney could have been the
dictator as well, if the arbitrary decision had favored Taney.
44
See also Allen M. Feldman & Roberto Serrano, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem:
Two Simple Single-Profile Versions, (Brown University Dept. of Econ. Working Paper
No. 2006–11 (2006)) (showing how the four assumptions can work together in examples
that remove each assumption, through one example and one assumption at a time).
42
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ii. Groups of Greater Than Two Individuals
The Article demonstrates that if only two individuals are
responsible for a decision and they follow the Arrovian scheme, then one
of the two individuals becomes a dictator. In Figure 2, Marshall is a
dictator because Marshall’s preferences perfectly coincided with every
possible outcome the decision function could make. The precursor to the
proof is that Range must exist (i.e., there must be at least three choices).
It follows then, that the Independence assumption, Pareto, and
Transitivity (and its necessary complement, Completeness) restrict
outcomes in such a way that only Marshall’s desires (or perhaps only
Taney’s desires) compose the ultimate outcomes. Thus, Non-dictatorship
fails. Critically, the result of who eventually becomes the dictator is
arbitrary.
Attempting to illustrate the preceding proof with more than two
individuals becomes much more complex. The number of profiles that
will come into play is significantly higher. For three individuals and
three choices, 216 profiles would be necessary.45 Following the forced
choices due to Independence, Transitivity, and Pareto is more difficult to
illustrate. It is possible to show “depth” or the “z-axis” on the grid with a
three-dimensional illustration using superscripts. The following
subsections offer an alternative based on Condorcet’s Paradox. The proof
in the preceding subsection provides the basis for the intuitition: an
arbitrary choice is made and the consequences of that choice affect all
outcomes. Most significantly, the Independence assumption forces other
profiles to obey the arbitrary decision.
A. A Majority Rule Problem: Condorcet’s Paradox
If a third member now enters the group, this will force an
examination of the tension between the Independence assumption and
the fundamental democratic tenet of majority rule. However, before
examining the proof with three individuals, a majority rule problem must
be acknowledged. The majority rule problem is called Condorcet’s
Paradox.46 Condorcet’s Paradox refers to the occurrence of a “cycle”
created by three or more individuals who attempt to use democratic
voting. Condorcet’s insight was that majority rule can fail to provide a
clear victor. There may be no majority outcome uncontested by another
45

For two individuals who have three choices, thirty-six profiles are required to fully
understand the “trickle-down” effects of Pareto, Transitivity, and Independence (3! x 3! =
36, where 3! = 3 x 2 x 1). For three individuals who have three choices, 216 profiles are
necessary to account for all possible permutations (3! x 3! x 3! = 216).
46
Arrow, supra note 17.
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majority. For example, imagine three individuals: Ben, Jerry, and Carvel,
where one choice must be made for all: chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry
ice cream (abbreviated as “c,” “v,” and “s”). Suppose Ben ranks the
choices as c, v, s; Jerry ranks the choices as v, s, c; and Carvel ranks the
choices as s, c, v:
Rank:
Ben
Jerry
Carvel

1st
c
v
s

2nd
v
s
c

3rd
s
c
v

The majority’s wishes are in complete conflict with one another.
Majority rule fails to provide a winning answer. Specifically, chocolate
should not win because a majority (two persons to one person) prefers
strawberry to chocolate. Vanilla should not win because a majority
prefers chocolate to vanilla, again by a vote of two to one. Lastly,
strawberry should not win because a majority prefers vanilla to
strawberry, two to one. Therefore, chocolate is preferred to vanilla, and
vanilla is preferred to strawberry, and strawberry is preferred to
chocolate. This could be represented as: (Chocolate) P (Vanilla) P
(Strawberry) P (Chocolate). However, the result presents a problem.
If one attempted to solve this through pair-wise voting (i.e., only
allow a vote on two flavors at a time), a cycle still exists: chocolate beats
vanilla in the first run-off. Next, strawberry beats chocolate. In the third
run-off, vanilla beats strawberry. This transitivity failure is referred to as
a “democratic cycle.”47
B. Begin with Condorcet’s Paradox and Apply Completeness
Returning to the Arrovian proof, assume three individuals,
Marshall, Taney, and Chase, ordinally rank the three choices of x, y, and
z. Condorcet’s Paradox exists where the majority vote results in a cycle;
no one agrees on any position. Specifically, of the 216 possible profiles
in this scenario, six profiles present this problem.48 These six profiles

47

For more on cycling, including an insightful illustration of cycling with a fiveninths majority rule, an 89% majority rule, a unanimity rule, and the resolution of cycles
through homogeneity, see MUELLER, supra note 23, at 99–101. For more on homogeneity
and Arrow, see generally Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44 (discussing simple and
complex diversity in conjunction with Arrow’s proof).
48
See Figure 3.
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account for approximately 3% of the 216 outcomes we might expect to
occur if the group is to make a decision among these choices.49
Individual Condorcet Paradox Profiles:
(1)
xyz
zxy
yzx

Marshall
Taney
Chase

(2)
xyz
yzx
zxy

(3)
yzx
xyz
zxy

(4)
yzx
zxy
xyz

(5)
zxy
xyz
yzx

(6)
zxy
yzx
xyz

Figure 3
Placed into a grid-framework, Figure 3’s first column of
preferences would appear like the following, where the superscripts
represent Chase’s preferences. (See Figure 4)50
Taney

3
2
1

y1
x3
1

2

z2
3

Marshall

Figure 4
(Chase’s preferences are represented by superscripts.)
To decide which individual wins among the three completely
unique preference sets is to arbitrarily pick a solution that will affect
outcomes for all other decision-scenarios. Yet this must be done
according to Transitivity’s “Completeness” requirement: some outcome
must succeed.
Following Feldman and Serrano’s analysis,51 first, acknowledge
that Completeness means there must be an outcome. No tie or lack of a
decision is acceptable. Next, assume some majority will win, so a 2-1
vote must occur, at the very least. Now, assume xPy. It does not matter
where one begins. Examine the votes in the first Condorcet Paradox
(again, one could start with any of them). In this first example, note that
49

This ~3% figure is not insignificant if the group, for example, makes hundreds or
thousands of decisions per year, or even 80–110, as in the case of the Supreme Court.
50
The superscripts add a “third dimension” that a two-dimensional diagram cannot
easily represent. Also, note that this is a different use of superscripts from Figures 1 and 2
above.
51
Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44, at 20–21.
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Marshall and Taney each individually voted xPy. It can be safely
concluded that these two must be the decisive majority. Part of the entire
group’s decision (a decision demanded by Completeness) is xPy.
Marshall and Taney are the majority. Considering z versus x, there are
two potential options:
First, perhaps z is preferred, or even simply ties with x. If this were
the case, since the group deems xPy, then Transitivity demands zPy. This
means Chase’s preference of zPx was important in the decision, which
contradicts the original assumption of who was in the decisive majority.
The dissenter, Chase, has votes that actually impact the outcome, so he
must be part of it. Why? The contradiction is forced by the assumptions,
demonstrating a breakdown in the decision-making mechanism. So in the
first alternative, it is impossible for the three to follow the rules.
Examining the second alternative, if there is no “tie” between z and
x, nor a victor of zPx, then the result is xPz. This is problematic, because
Marshall’s choices are preferred in the face of contrary preferences made
by both Taney and Chase. We thus have an Arrovian dictator: Marshall.
Arrow’s proof demands one of the conditions must be relaxed, and in
this second scenario, it is Non-dictatorship.52
Throughout the profiles, the Independence, Pareto, and Transitivity
assumptions “trickle-down” to force certain choices, thus sealing the fate
of the decision-making mechanism. Who actually wins is not the key; the
relevant factor is that the winner was arbitrarily chosen (i.e., no majority
vote applied—simply the inherent Arrovian dictator’s decisions).
The trickle-down effect functions the same way it did in the
discussion of the two-person vote in the analysis of Profile 7 from Figure
1, above. Like in the prior example, when one of the three individuals’
unique preferences sets wins, effects of the Independence Transitivity
and Pareto assumptions trickle-down here through all 216 profiles.
Similar to the example involving two people, the seemingly incongruous
result is that the majority vote will not always result in a victory for that
majority. Even two-to-one votes will result in outcomes where the lone
dissenter’s preferences match the actual outcome. For example, when
Marshall and Taney completely agree on the ordering of x, y, and z
(which will occur thirty-six times in the 216 profiles, or 16.67% of the

52

The focus of this Article is not on the intricacies of Arrow’s Proof; for further
discussion about the proof, see generally MUELLER, supra note 23; Arrow, supra note 17;
Vickrey, supra note 26; Hansen, supra note 17; Alex Tabarrok, Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem, 8–9, (2005), mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/arrowstheorem.pdf (last visited Feb. 13,
2008); and Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44 (explaining why Arrow survives
Samuelson’s arguments, and showing how to relax one assumption at a time).
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time), Chase will disagree with both, and could win a 1-2 vote in thirty
(83.33%) of these thirty-six profiles, should Chase be the dictator.
In Figure 4, above, each possible outcome complies with only one
individual’s preferences. The tensions are resolved on the arbitrary
decisions made when no majority rule exists. In this Condorcet Paradox
representation, Independence applies its tension resolution demand to the
other profiles. The result again is a dictator. Since Non-dictatorship has
failed, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem applies to groups of not only two
voters, but also three or more voters with equal weight.
The three-member example does not violate Pareto because there is
no unanimous positioning in a Condorcet Paradox. To reiterate, in a
Condorcet Paradox consider a profile where chocolate beats vanilla,
which beats strawberry, which beats chocolate. This situation does not
violate Transitivity because there is no conclusion about which profile
ranks ahead of another profile in a cycle. There is no presumption that
xPy is used with conclusion yPz to mandate xPz. Thus, nothing exists for
Transitivity to operate upon. Because of the Independence assumption,
Marshall and Taney must conform to Chase’s desires, or Marshall and
Chase to Taney’s, or Taney and Chase to Marshall’s desires. All produce
an unacceptable result according to majority rule—one vote will defeat
two votes. The culmination that occurs when all profiles are ordered
under Arrow’s criteria is a final result of Arrovian dictatorship.
The Condorcet Paradox problem and Transitivity’s Completeness
characteristic illustrate that the dictator defeats a majority vote. Since an
outcome was demanded among conflicts where there was no majority, a
dictator must have existed. The dictator was chosen arbitrarily,
discovered among equal shares in a three-way tie. Current American
social norms do not allow this in the political process when, for example,
choosing an elected representative. If the dictator was not chosen
arbitrarily, but purposefully, why was there a group decision in the first
instance?
Since a Condorcet Paradox exists for three persons or three million
persons and higher, the decisive outcome will always devolve to one
arbitrary decision among any number of individuals, leaving one person,
even among millions, as an Arrovian dictator in group decisions. In
conclusion, the core intuition of the two-person proof applies to groups
of greater than two persons—one dictator exists for arbitrary reasons.53
53
For an alternative proof using a popular “boxes in boxes” metaphor, see MUELLER,
supra note 23, at 584–85 (citing William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision
Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507, 507–35 (Nov. 1960)). In the proof, a “decisive” group
successfully controls the outcome among several choices; subsequently, that group is
divided into two groups and the process repeats until the decisive group for all
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This Article previously explained how Completeness demanded an
arbitrary decision. The arbitrary decision operates to make demands on
all other possibilities primarily through the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives characteristic. As a result, majority rule fails, and a dictator
exists. Condorcet’s Paradox, Completeness, and the tension between
Independence and the majority rule illustrate the impact of Arrow’s proof
for voting between two persons or more.
C. Relaxing Postulates
The intuition behind Arrow’s proof should now be clearer—
following Arrovian assumptions assures a failure in the decision
mechanism. To solve the problem, one assumption must be “relaxed,”54
or else, as demonstrated above, an arbitrary decision among ordinal
preferences will inevitably lead to an arbitrarily-chosen dictator. If the
choice is not arbitrary, then there is no need for a group.
The Independence assumption is the most controversial aspect of
the Theorem; consequently, scholars typically suggest that it should be
the first assumption relaxed.55 Further examination of the Independence
principle reveals two characteristics: (1) changes in the set of variables
considered may not alter ordinal preference rankings (i.e., if xPyPz and
remove y, there should still exist xPz); and, more importantly, (2)
Independence implies that a voting system can only respond to ordinal
information about preferences.56 The first implied principle means if one
were asked to choose an apple, a banana, or an orange, one’s preferences
between any two may not change after the removal of one of the choices.
This implication should be viewed skeptically. It is not clearly necessary
for a “fair” voting mechanism, as the Article later seeks to address.
An example of the second implication is if one were asked to select
an apple, a banana, or an orange to eat, but is not permitted to explain
alternatives is found to be one individual. Thus, the principle that one person makes all
decisions violates the Non-dictatorship assumption. For another important proof
“uncovering the dictator,” see Alan P. Kirmanand & Dieter Sondermann, Arrow’s
Theorem, Many Agents, and Invisible Dictators, 5 Q.J. ECON. 267, 267–77 (Oct. 1972)
(proving that one dictator exists even with infinite numbers of voters).
54
The term “relax” in this context means to either partly, or perhaps completely
reduce the constraints mandated by the Arrovian assumption.
55
Tabarrok, supra note 52.
56
Id. Tabarrok notes there is confusion among economists about why there are in
fact two implications to Independence. This confusion is mentioned for the benefit of
readers who may have seen alternative explanations written elsewhere. The discrepancy
is due, in part, because Arrow himself mathematically defined one implication yet
explained the meaning of the second implication in his 1951 paper. Some authors only
focus on one of the implications, as with Mueller’s 1989 Public Choice text. Id. at 6.
However, this discussion does not.
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how much any one fruit is desired over another. The selector must
simply rank the choices as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. An alternative, but currently
prohibited idea, is to allow the selector to rank the preferences
cardinally. This means the selector would be able to explain how much
he desired one product over the other; the apple might be worth ten, and
the banana and orange two and one, respectively.57
Tabarrok states that Independence is often defended pragmatically,
and that the Independence criterion requires individuals to tell the truth.58
Some argue that without Independence, it “would be too difficult” to
ascertain true cardinal values about preferences.59 These defenses should
be dismissed. A theoretician’s “ease of use” is no reason to demand the
severe restrictions imposed by Independence.
A second defense is that it appears paradoxical that dropping a
losing choice “z” may lead to a different winner. Tabarrok explains that
these arguments will not suffice.60 Using choices from the 1992 U.S.
Presidential election, for example, demonstrates the problem with
majority rule and dropping “choice z.” The 1992 U.S. Presidential
election offered three prominent choices: Clinton, Bush, and Perot.
Though the U.S. Presidential election is not based on popular vote, the
popular vote hypothetical provides an appropriate illustration.
The Independence criterion implies that the preference between
Clinton and Bush is independent of Perot’s presence in the race.
However, if Perot receives 18% of the popular vote, Clinton receives
43%, and Bush receives 39%, then Perot’s presence might make a
difference. Without Perot in the race, where do the Perot votes “go?” The
popular vote result was (Clinton) P (Bush) P (Perot) when Perot was in
the race. It should be understandable that, again on popular vote, (Bush)
P (Clinton) is possible with Perot out of the race. The latter result would
57
The unit of reference is not important: it could be ten dollars, ten yen, or ten
bananas. However, there is a problem of “normalizing” cardinal preferences, which is
discussed in Part V. Borrowing from science and mathematics, “normalizing” serves to
enable comparisons based on comparable units. One may compare feet, inches, and
centimeters because these measurements can be objectively compared through a simple
algorithm. Without this normalization, we are colloquially comparing “apples to
oranges.”
58
Tabarrok, supra note 52. Independence must apply because without it, theorists
have no idea when individuals are using strategy to ensure that their second favorite
preference wins. Howard Chang explains Independence as a pragmatic solution. See
Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000). Although the article discusses social welfare, the
criticism of the Independence condition is the same. Chang suggests this pragmatic
appeal is the collective focus, but asserts Independence is not clearly necessary for
“fairness” in society.
59
Id.
60
Tabarrok, supra note 52.
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occur if Bush received greater than two-thirds of Perot’s votes.61 This
represents a 12% “swing” from Perot’s 18%. Bush would then defeat
Clinton because 51% is greater than 49%.62
Utilizing the preceding example of ordinal versus cardinal
distinctions, the mandate of ordinal rankings and the Independence
assumption that demands the use of ordinal rankings should both be
viewed skeptically. A group making a decision should not be forced into
these problems simply because Independence “seems” right.
Independence should not be relaxed even if the assumption is
problematic. The ultimate resolution is that there is no good answer and
this is, in fact, the assumption we should relax. Yet before simply
accepting this, the Article will examine several more defenses of the
Independence assumption.
Arrow himself defended Independence as a reasonable axiom
because a decision-making system with this characteristic ensures an
“appealing” result ex ante.63 However, the Independence principle is
quite restrictive—in fact perhaps more so than the Pareto principle.64 As
Tabarrok and Chang note, the Independence restriction is controversial.65
Chang suggests (perhaps without being convinced by the idea) that there
is pragmatic appeal. He explains that because there are large information
costs in analyzing alternatives, society must invest scarce public
resources in public choices.66 The simplified process using Independence
may reduce the costs of operating a voting system. Further, the

61

This Article uses 12% as the key variable, but actually the figure is one vote more
than 11.00%. This change would create the necessary “swing” between Bush and Clinton
where Perot is not running.
62
As another example, the 2000 U.S. Presidential election generated scrutiny for the
electoral votes in Florida. According to the 2000 Federal Election Commission results,
Bush received less than 600 votes over Gore, but many of Nader’s 97,000(+) votes would
probably have supported Gore if Nader had not run. A bare majority of Nader’s votes,
50.0001%, would have given Gore the critical difference. Thus, the idea that
Independence should be seen as an entirely palatable constraint is not clearly correct. See
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/prespop.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2007). For a “popculture” reference to this voting problem, consider a debate in the film industry regarding
Marisa Tomei’s Best Supporting Oscar win for the film “My Cousin Vinny” as another
“failure” in democratic voting. This could also be a “failure” of the Independence
postulate. See http://movies.msn.com/movies/oscars2007/surprises (last visited Jan. 5,
2008).
63
Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the
Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 226 (2000).
64
Id. at 228.
65
Id. at 229.
66
Id. at 229–30.
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alternative requires determining cardinal utilities of all individuals,
which is a task that is currently not attainable.67
These suggestions are too vague when the positive problem of
cycling is so readily present. Perot, Nader, and strawberry are relevant to
elections because the presence of each affects the respective election’s
outcome. The issue remains as to which remaining candidate receives the
votes for Perot, Nader, or strawberry when those choices are dropped
from the contest. “Ease of use” should not be accepted as a sufficient
rationale touting the necessity of the Independence principle. For society
to purposefully ignore the third choice is to irrationally ignore what is
profoundly relevant. Therefore, since Independence has such
unappealing consequences, the assumption should remain a viable option
to be relaxed.
Next consider the consequences of relaxing alternative Arrovian
assumptions. This Article suggests that it is infeasible to consider
whether Non-dictatorship or the Pareto principle should be relaxed. First,
allowing Non-dictatorship to be relaxed would mean it is ethically
palatable to have a single individual in the Senate, the House of
Representatives, or on the Supreme Court controlling the results of that
body. A problem which readily presents itself is who to choose? Perhaps
Justice X is a highly esteemed and competent arbiter, but should the
Justice, picked ex ante, speak for all nine Justices forever? Or only this
term? Or only for a certain case? The reasonable conclusion that follows
this logic indicates that Non-dictatorship cannot be relaxed.
Moreover, the idea of relaxing the Pareto constraint is without
promise. If 100 members of the Senate intend to vote for a certain policy,
it appears completely absurd to prohibit that policy’s enactment. Yet this
would have to occur at times if Pareto were relaxed instead of one of the
other assumptions. Specifically, outcome zyx may occur when all 100
votes go to alternate xyz in order to refute Non-dictatorship. A clear
majority rule victor by 100% vote would not be a permissible outcome in
a percentage of the scenarios.68
67

The cardinal utilities determination problem is, colloquially, the problem of
attempting to weigh “apples and oranges.” For example, if I say policy x is worth twenty,
and A says the policy is worth nine, how do we know which is greater? We do not,
because we cannot compare subjective perceptions of utility. This is the problem of
weighing cardinal utilities. See MUELLER, supra note 23, at 590–91, 595–96.
68
For example, in Figure 2, supra, one of the Profiles 1 through 6 must fail among
two individuals if Pareto is relaxed. All y z tensions would resolve as yPz due to
Independence. Transitivity forces multiple outcomes, as well. Range is satisfied because
there are at least three choices. What remains are Profiles 1 through 6 and the question of
whether Non-dictatorship will be met in this case where Pareto is relaxed. Unless one of
those six outcomes does not comport with the unanimous votes, an Arrovian dictator
exists, thus violating Non-dictatorship.
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Mueller asks whether Transitivity may be relaxed, and says this is
possible, but it will either (1) produce an oligarchy, or (2) would simply
need a new ethical norm that accepts arbitrariness and inconsistency.
Currently, our ethical norms and laws assert constitutional protections
against such characteristics.69 As an example, consider a situation where
100 members of the Senate find xPy, regardless of their ranking of
choice z. The existence of an outcome of yPz seems absurd. Further, it is
unpredictable when this should occur, except to conclude that it is
controlled by the other four assumptions of Pareto, Non-dictatorship,
Range, and Independence. Thus, relaxing Transitivity is infeasible as
well.
The final option is relaxing Range, that is, limiting choices to less
than three. First, there is the problem of limiting all choices to two
options. This cannot occur. Any proposal to limit options to two
inherently fails Arrow’s proof. Put another way, there is no method to
select the mechanism to reduce the options. This is not only itself an
inherent Range problem (as there are surely more than two ways of
limiting a choice to two options), but there is also the complication of
appointing the initial agenda setter if choices are made among pairs. In
the Range problem, an Arrovian dictator controls the group decision
about how to limit the options to two choices. This dictator is itself the
original problem. The latter problem is the “agenda control” problem,
where an individual who decides how to choose pairs may strategically
control the outcome.
The second alternative is to have someone choose among two
options, then pit the winner against the third afterwards, repeating this
for all choices until one “winner” exists. If attempted, Condorcet’s
Paradox may lead to “agenda control.” To reiterate, Condorcet’s Paradox
is the name given to the occurrence of a “cycle” created by three or more
individuals who attempt to use a democratic voting in a unique but not
necessarily rare scenario. Agenda control is the use of a strategy when a
group uses its authority to personally benefit from the situation. Recall
the cycling example above of chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry.
Although strawberry defeats chocolate, a committee head could
undermine the process by never asking this question. Rather, transitivity
is assumed, mistakenly, to prove that chocolate wins since chocolate
69

See, e.g., Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1974) (emphasizing that the
“touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government” (citations omitted)); Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(invalidating, due to “arbitrariness,” the S.E.C.’s hedge fund rule determining that the
word “client” has different meanings in different parts of the same act. Chevron
deference did not provide sufficient agency protection).
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defeats vanilla which beats strawberry. With this possibility in mind, a
committee head with agenda control could raise issues strategically in
pair-wise voting. The committee head would ensure the defeat of issues
that would certainly defeat his own preferences. Thus, limiting Range is
infeasible. Not only is the mechanism of limiting range an inherent
Arrovian problem, but it also may lead to agenda control issues.
Some argue, however, that limiting Range to two issues at times
will benefit society, for legal issues such standing, certiorari, and
jurisdiction stripping.70 The feasibility of limiting range is discussed in
Parts III and IV. At this point, the Article has articulated how groups
experience decision-making problems.71 The impact of these lessons on
the legislature and the judiciary are explored next.
III. DOES ARROW PRECLUDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT?
Statutory and constitutional interpretation is grounded in multiple
jurisprudential issues. Broadly, the law’s meaning may be derived from
three places: (1) the text itself, (2) the intent behind the text, and (3) the
judge (as law-reader and law-giver).
A. Legislative Intent and the Limits for Interpretivism
This Article assumes that, when searching for the liberal project’s
Rule of Law, intentionalism is the high water mark for judicial authority
in statutory interpretation cases because it offers the most restriction. The
70

Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) (arguing that limiting range is a reason for the
standing doctrine).
71
The Arrovian conditions are extremely easy to misinterpret, partly because much
of the language in the proof connotes powerful ideas. A mathematical “dictator” in the
proof is quite different than the political version the word normally implies. The
Independence condition seems extremely palatable and appealing (perhaps for Chang’s
pragmatic reasons), but is actually quite a severe restriction on decision-making. Some
commentators incorrectly understand Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem:
(1) “[D]emocratic decisions that meet certain basic criteria [referring to Arrovian
assumptions] are not derivable from any process free from arbitrary or undemocratic
constraints on social choice.” Ronald A Cass, Looking with One Eye Closed: The
Twilight of Administrative Law, DUKE L.J. 238, 245 (1986) (emphasis added). Rather,
there are processes that function—today—in legislatures which allow cardinal bargaining
and thus relax Independence.
(2) “The Impossibility Theorem is that legislative outcomes may not reflect a coherent
outcome because the outcome chosen depends on the order different proposals are
considered.” Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 508, n.148 (1989). This is the voting paradox developed by Condorcet and
further studied by Arrow, and is not Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. The Impossibility
Theorem instead concerns ordinal rankings in conjunction with the five Arrovian
assumptions.
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judiciary must act as the legislature’s agent unless there is a conflict with
the state or federal constitution. In such a case, the judiciary acts as the
agent for that constitution. In this way judges might “apply” the laws
intended for them rather than “actively legislate” from the bench.
Legal hermeneutics commentators correctly argue that textualism
does not act as a further limiting mechanism for statutory interpretation
issues. These commentators reason that there are infinite potential
meanings for pure text.72 In the simplest example, “cane” may have a
meaning depending on the language. In English the text may signal a tool
used to aid someone walking; in Italian it may mean dog. As Levinson
explained, “[t]here are as many plausible readings of the United States
Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet, even though each
interpreter, like each director, might genuinely believe that he or she has
stumbled onto the one best answer to the conundrums of the texts.”73
Theoretically there are infinite possible meanings for any text,
which are only interpreted into an order through context. However, using
context means to use something other than text, and is invalid under
“pure” textualism. Thus, out of infinite possible meanings in a text,
judges cannot reliably find the Rule of Law. As no objectively correct
answer exists, the bounds are limited to “reasonableness,” which
provides no objective principles to “apply.”74
This article assumes that it is impermissible for judges to determine
intent themselves since that would mean the law-interpreter, or lawreader, is the law-giver. There, a judge is correct in an interpretation
simply because the judge has power. Subjective power should not be
allowed to create the Rule of Law either.
An alternative is to decide cases according to “neutral principles.”
Mark Tushnet has discredited this position as mandating a “presumed
shared understanding of the role of judicial reasoning in our polity.”75
Tushnet argues that such a proposition is false—there is no presumed
shared understanding. Others have similarly commented that any

72

The text itself must be an inappropriate place from which to derive meaning.
Wittgenstein comments how rules do not determine their own application, while Kelsen
and H.L.A. Hart show that the status of a text cannot ultimately be determined by the text
itself. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 460–61 (2000).
73
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982).
74
According to Fuller’s famous case, all interpreters are “correct.” Lon L. Fuller, The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
75
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).

332

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:303

assertion finding neutral principles is inherently flawed by the subjective
suggestion of what is neutral.76
What remains is legislative intent, which becomes a necessary
guide the judiciary relies on to interpret and decide cases.77 Without
legislative intent, statutory interpretation issues are left to some other
presumably inappropriate power. The focus of this Article thus shifts to
examine how “[t]he text only remains an object of interpretation . . . if
what the text is and what it means are determined by the author’s
intention.”78 Consequently, there is a critical importance in finding
legislative intent.
B. What is Legislative Intent?
Legislative intent is clarified by Gerald MacCallum’s examination,
which revealed that that the fundamental question, “What is legislative
intent?” contains multiple questions, including, but not limited to, the
following:
How did the legislator intend the words to be
understood?
What was the legislator’s intent in enacting the
statute—i.e., “what did he intend the enactment to
achieve,” versus “what did he intend the enactment to
achieve in terms of his own career”?
What is the difference between the legislature’s
“intent” and intent of the several legislators?
76
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 218–19, 231 (Harvard University
Press (2002)) (commenting that Dworkinism is inherently subjective).
77
A second definition of the Rule of Law that comports with these suggestions is that
“[l]aw is a normative system backed by a credible threat of physical force against the
violator of norms.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 266–67 (6th
ed. 2003) (citing Hans Kelsen’s definition). Posner proposes that the Rule of Law must
have “formal rationality” (Max Weber’s phrasing) which requires the following
characteristics in addition to Kelsen’s:
(1) a capability of being complied with by those to whom it is addressed;
(2) must treat equally those who are similarly situated in all respects relevant to the
command;
(3) it must be public; and
(4) there must be a procedure by which the truth of any facts necessary to the application
of the command according to its terms is ascertained.
Id. (adopting Kelsen, H., PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans. 1967); JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237–39 (Oxford University Press 1971)).
78
STEVEN KNAPP & WALTER B. MICHAELS, INTENTION, IDENTITY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: A RESPONSE TO DAVID HOY, LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 187, 191 (Gregory
Levh ed., 1992).
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Was his intent to enact a statute—i.e., was the
enacting not accidental or a mistake?79
Do the words mean precisely what he supposed them
to mean when he endorsed them?80

For purposes of this Article, the issue is narrowed to MacCallum’s
insight about legislative “meaning” versus “purpose.” The Article seeks
some version of the former.81 The paramount issue here is not whether
this proper “meaning” is (a) what a reasonable objective person would
understand the intent to be, (b) the intent flowing from a compromise, or
(c) something related to the psychology of a key legislator. What is
important in the examination is that there may be something there to
discover. The question that follows next is whether Arrow shows that the
legislature cannot create such “intent,” and this Article concludes no.
C. Arrow’s Theorem Will Not Disprove the Existence of Legislative
Intent
Some commentators incorrectly assert that Arrow’s Theorem
disproves the existence of legislative intent. They are incorrect because
they do not sufficiently analyze the “relaxation” of the assumptions.
Certain examples of these commentators include:
1. “[Arrow’s Theorem] implies that it is not possible to guarantee
that a majority rule process will yield coherent choices.”82 This leads to
“incoherence” that will “take the form of the nonexistence of a
collectively ‘best’ alternative.”83

79

See, e.g., Shear, D., Va. Error Reinstates Blue Law, Workers Can Insist On
Sundays Off, WASHINGTON POST, July 2, 2004, at A01.
80
MacCallum, Jr., Gerald C., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 755–59 (1965).
81
MacCallum himself did not conclude that one answer was correct. Rather, for him
“[n]o one model of legislative intent is either so strongly or so weakly supported as to
make its use either unproblematic or absurd.” 75 YALE L.J. at 786. For more discussion
on how judges might find legislative intent, see, e.g., Zeppos, N., Legislative History and
the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation,
76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990) (arguing that perhaps collective intent is not intractably
problematic and citing how the law finds that the collective actions of corporations may
contain “intent” to discriminate). How to find intent is not important in this Article. The
Article’s focus is that the judiciary’s group decisions cannot find intent objectively, and
thus cannot determine one clear answer.
82
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241 (1992).
83
Id.

334

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:303

2. “Arrow’s Theorem reveals that, in theory, public decision
making processes cannot be designed in ways that are fair and that
preclude the possibility that decisions will cycle . . . .”84
3. Then Professor, now Judge Easterbrook offered: “it turns out to
be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists [of individual
legislators’ preferences] into a coherent collective choice.”85 Easterbrook
has argued that Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows how a judge cannot
find and implement legislative intent.86
According to Daniel Farber, Easterbrook “would . . . jettison the
whole idea of legislative intent as a guide to interpretation,” in part due
to Arrow.87 Easterbrook has continued to reason that since “there is no
virtuous way to aggregate private wills into collective decisions,” then
Arrow’s Theorem therefore shows that legislative compromises cannot
be interpreted, as they have no single “common spirit.”88 He then
concludes that “formalism” is the restrictive answer to this problem, so
judges must ignore the idea of legislative intent. This Article concludes
that Arrow does not mean legislative intent is a fiction. First, however, it
reviews some alternative responses to these criticisms.
Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins state that using Arrow to
make conclusions about legislative intent is an “exaggeration” of
Arrow’s Theorem.89 They reason that Arrow’s assumptions are not
necessarily principles “required for reasonable and fair democratic
decision-making.”90 Rather, “fair” decision-making is not precluded
unless one equates fairness with Arrow’s short list of conditions. The
scholars further argue that Arrow’s Theorem is irrelevant to the
84

Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,”
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REV. 483, 404 n.88 (1993). As another example of an incorrect understanding of
“group choice,” see Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 37 (1999)
(attacking public choice normatively rather than showing how Arrow’s Theorem and
cycling are misunderstood).
85
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983).
86
Frank H. Easterbrook, Symposium: Changing Images of the State: The State of
Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328
(1994).
87
Daniel A. Farber, and Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423 (1988). Farber further comments that Easterbrook’s concern is the
“extent to which legislation reflects a coherent congressional view of the public interest.”
Id. at 424.
88
Easterbrook, supra note 86, at 1339.
89
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, New Perspectives on Statutory
Interpretation: Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against
Legislative Intent, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585 (2005).
90
Id.
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importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation and is therefore
misapplied in jurisprudence. However, Lupia and McCubbins fail to
provide technical insight into why Arrow’s assumptions are not “fair.”
Next, Farber argues that Arrow’s Theorem has been misunderstood,
and is in fact normatively impotent for interpretative philosophers.
Farber suggests instead that Arrow’s Theorem means the attempt to
govern inevitably suffers from certain distortions, but this does not make
any specific form of judicial interpretation a better answer over another.
Farber analogizes this issue to the failure to make a completely accurate
two dimensional map of a three dimensional world—something that does
not prevent the usefulness of making maps. This is an interesting analogy
but it is inconclusive as to what “should” occur in the legislature’s
creation of statutes.
Farber maintains that public choice supports a “pragmatic
approach” to legislative intent, and nothing more. While Easterbrook’s
position is that Arrow’s work “renders legislative outcomes suspect,”91
Farber indicates that at most, less weight should rest on some
background information and more on others.92 Rather than debunking the
legislative process with cynicism toward political bodies, “public choice
models can provide some insights into the realities of legislation and
statutory interpretation, without at the same time destroying respect for
democratic institutions.”93 Farber’s answer is more complete and thus
better than Lupia and McCubbins’ answer. However, Hovenkamp
furthers the analysis of legislatures.
D. Hovenkamp: Independence Does Not Apply to Legislatures
Herbert Hovenkamp provides the most sufficient and technically
correct insight regarding the way legislatures operate. Hovenkamp posits
that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption is
inapplicable to a legislature.94 When Independence is dropped, individual
legislators logroll, filibuster, and bargain among political positions.
Hovenkamp accurately states this “is no more ‘strategic’ than a person’s
market-driven decision to purchase her second choice when she cannot

91

Farber, supra note 87, at 429.
Id. at 469.
Id.
94
Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government,
75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 953 (1990). See also Herbet Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-being,
and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 63, 90 (1990) (commenting that “[i]ndeterminacy .
. . exists mostly at the margins” (Id. at 90); also commenting that Easterbrook overstates
the Arrovian case (Id. at 116 n.66)).
92
93
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afford her first.”95 Dropping Independence means legislatures “trade”
cardinally rather than ordinally. This answer solves Arrow, as groups
with equal voice can (and in fact do) use a “currency” to bargain.
The “currency” is cardinalized bargaining, which may provide
comparative advantages for all. According to James Buchanan and
Gordon Tullock, there is a benefit to equal votes finding a means to trade
cardinally: the invaluable resource of legislative powers may be traded
among preferences, and thus a limited resource may be more efficiently
used for the betterment of all.96
For example, logrolling may create incentives for representatives
“to act even with respect to matters in which they have very little
interest.”97 The alternative is to leave groups stuck in an ordinal world
where the supposed truth-telling benefit of the Independence assumption
results in restricted choices that lead to a dictator and worse. These
“worse” consequences exist because, as shown above in Part I, without
the relaxation of Independence, another assumption must relax. Majority
rule will certainly fail at arbitrary times, and whatever characteristic
aside from Independence is relaxed, the consequence becomes an
ethically unsound process that produces arbitrary results. Society
condemns such arbitrary occurrences and this arbitrariness is
constitutionally prohibited.
Therefore, instead of rejecting acts of logrolling, these legislative
bargains should be recognized not only as legitimate, but also as a
necessary predicate for confidence in the legislature’s creation of
statutes. Again, the issue of “how” to find the intent is suspended, and
intentionalism is presumed to be the most restrictive form of
interpretation when applying the Rule of Law. Without these bargains,
statutory interpretation of legislative decision-making is a façade; no
intent could possibly exist for a statute. Rather, the Rule of Law would
be based only on the power of interpreters to cherry-pick among infinite
meanings of pure text (textualism), pure power of interpreters (judge as
law-giver), or guaranteed arbitrariness and a failure of majority rule in a
political body (relaxation of any Arrovian assumption other than
95

Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government,
75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 953 (1990).
96
On the importance and benefit of logrolling, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 132–33 (1962) (explaining how logrolling moves toward Pareto optimality).
See also David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of
Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (2001) (suggesting logrolling is necessary to prevent
cycling). Buchanan won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986, largely for this work.
97
Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 968 (1988).

2008]

Applying the Rule of Law Subjectively

337

Independence). Thus, legislative bargains are the correct paths to
creating legislative intent. There is no Herculean answer that Dworkin
seeks, anywhere else in statutory interpretation theory.
Perhaps the “most general theory of institutional failure,”98 Arrow
has provided a convincingly positive analysis about the interaction
between the legislature and the judiciary. So far, the Rule of Law is not
prohibited through the Impossibility Theorem. It is not yet prohibited
because it is, at least in theory, possible for legislative intent to exist.
This possibility is not precluded by Arrow’s proof because the legislature
relaxes Independence.
The next issue then becomes: How will the judiciary, specifically
the multi-member appellate courts, handle interpretive jurisprudence in
light of Arrow’s proof? Part IV explores the troublesome positive
instruction for interpretation. This problem is predominantly based on the
Range and Independence assumptions.
IV. MULTIMEMBER JUDICIAL DECISIONS
This Article shows how a legislature may potentially create a
collective “intent.” The prime focus is on the collective decision-making
process of legislatures and courts to answer whether it is possible for the
appellate courts to “apply” intentionalism in an objective manner, and
this Article contends that it is not.
Legislative intent may exist under Arrow’s Theorem utilizing a
cardinal preference currency. In a cardinal bargaining currency,
legislators accept and use mechanisms such as logrolling, filibusters, and
earmarks to act on the legislator’s strength of preferences. In effect, the
legislators trade for the limited resources that are other legislators’ votes.
However, there are ethical considerations that consider vote-trading
between judges as anathema to the Rule of Law. Arrow demands
relaxation of one of the five assumptions in the judiciary so that appellate
courts can function without a “dictator.” This Article concludes that the
Independence assumption must be relaxed in the judiciary, as well as in
the legislative branch.99
98
Bruce Chapman, Between Markets and Politics: A Social Choice Theoretic
Appreciation of the Charitable Sector, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 821, 866 (1998).
99
The “division fallacy” is to assume a unitary judiciary. Adrian Vermeule, The
Judiciary is a They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). Vermeule claims the division fallacy muddles much
theorizing about legal interpretation. Problems arise because commentators overlook the
collective nature of a judicial body. That a given approach is good for the whole court
does not mean it is good for that judge alone. Vermeule claims the best approach for any
individual judge will vary depending on whether other judges adopt the same approach.
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This will mean, paradoxically, that the power the judiciary uses to
determine legislative intent undermines the Rule of Law because the
Rule’s capability as a restrictive mechanism founders. Objectivity and
the law’s capability to be “applied” as a tool are both weakened. That is,
the Rule of Law legitimately restricts similar cases to be treated alike,
ensuring that all are equal before the law regardless of whatever
subjective preferences the judges may hold. This presumption works if
the objective Rule of Law is “applied” rather than created by objective
power. However, its purpose is undermined unless Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives is relaxed in multimember courts. The next
section of this Article examines the jurisprudential consequences of
relaxing Independence.
A. Non-dictatorship and Pareto
As they are within the legislature, Pareto and Non-dictatorship
should be dismissed as the “relax-able” criteria. Were all judges on a
court to prefer y as the best answer, the outcome z is not acceptable from
that court (a non-Pareto answer). This must occur, at arbitrary times, if
Pareto were relaxed. Nor are one single judge’s preferences followed in
every single case, as would happen with an Arrovian dictator.100 Again, a
dictator exists where, ex ante, any and all possible future decisions
comport with the dictator’s preferences, no matter what the content of the
other votes. All 216 possible rankings of three choices among three
individual judges would have to match with one judge’s desires.
Majority rule does not apply in such a scenario. What is the purpose of
having multimember courts in such a scenario? Who should serve as the
lone Justice? It is impossible to find this Herculean individual. There is
no purpose in discussing the merits of group decisions if majority rule
does not apply. These options would occur in either scenario, and are
thus rejected outright.
For example, division fallacy is pervasive in arguments that would justify textualism by
its disciplining effect on legislatures that praise canons of construction. Id. at 583.
Easterbrook has noted that the “entire judiciary is modeled as a single judge on a single
court. It isn’t.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the
Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 288 (1992). Easterbrook agrees
that courts with multiple members produce “cycling, path dependence, and other unhappy
outcomes.” Id.
100
For evidence that there is no dictator, see any one of the Harvard Law Review’s annual
Supreme Court issues. The section on “Term Statistics” shows majorities and dissents
that contain all Justices, a situation which could never occur with an Arrovian dictator.
See, e.g., Harvard Law Review, The Statistics,www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/119/No
v05/Statistics.pdf.
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B. Stearns and Standing
Maxwell Stearns has argued that appellate courts prevent Arrovian
cycling and arbitrary outcomes by developing procedural doctrines like
standing to reduce Range.101 According to this idea, limiting the number
of binary comparisons relative to the number of available options
removes the decision from the Arrovian framework. Stearns’ suggestion
that this would help reduce Arrovian problems is correct. In Arrovian
terms, Stearns’ argument for the standing doctrine is that limiting Range
achieves the simple and fewest number of possible issues in a case, and
thereby allows Pareto, Non-dictatorship, Independence, and Transitivity
to “work” to efficiently lead to a “best” answer.
Path dependence problems would be restricted by standing, but this
assumes the law is applied objectively, and that standing is applied
objectively. If this were the case, opportunistic ideological litigants could
not manipulate path dependence through the three major subsets of (1)
no right to enforce the rights of others, (2) no right to prevent diffuse
harms, and (3) no right to an undistorted market.102 However, as Stearns
recognizes, the development of the standing doctrine itself was made by
judicial powers. Therefore, to say path dependence is restricted by the
standing doctrine is to beg the question of how one would objectively
apply the “science of interpretation.”103
However, this Article suggests that there are never less than three
jurisprudential issues before a court.104 Again, attempting to limit Range
raises the question of what jurisprudential philosophy exists in the
background for cases that do reach courts. During the start of a statutory
interpretation case, for example, originalism, pragmatism, or
Dworkinism will fail to provide a single, discrete and strict method as to
how to limit Range. The same goes for the standing doctrine or Chevron
deference, as an example of another means of reducing issues in front of
101
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995)
102
Stearns, supra note 101, at 1309.
103
Stearns’ study of Range examines the New Deal Supreme Court, as well as the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, to prove his thesis on the power of judicial control of
standing. Id. at 1401. Consider that the determination of a constitutional or statutory
“injury” is not clearly defined in the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 562–63 (1992) (observing that although the desire to observe an animal species for
aesthetic purposes is “undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing,” there
was no standing for the plaintiff to sue because the injury was not definitely predictable).
104
Outcome voting, rather than issue voting, ensures a decision even when no
majority agrees on both the issue and the conclusion (outcome). See Tracey E. George &
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Constitutional Law: How is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2002) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS:
A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING (2000)).
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federal courts. Consider that the “ideal” originalists on an appellate court
might assert differences of opinion as to how to find the original intent
while pragmatists are patently fraught with anarchical priorities due to a
lack of a guiding star. Dworkin’s Herculean judge would search for the
“best answer” with little to assure himself that another Herculean judge
will reach the same “best” conclusion. Thus, it is never possible to
completely limit Range to the necessary two issues in front of multimember appellate panels.105 This remains so whether asserting
“standing,” Chevron deference, legal ethics or judicial codes, or any
other doctrine attempting to limit issues or create responsibilities.
The method used to decide how to limit Range is itself subject to
the Arrovian proof. Range, therefore, is not the answer to what must be
relaxed.106 There is no objective way to perform this “relaxation.”
C. Easterbrook and Transitivity
Easterbrook’s seminal article combining Arrow and Supreme Court
jurisprudence attempted to determine which Arrovian assumption must
be relaxed. Easterbrook concluded that the Court must keep the four
characteristics of Range, Non-dictatorship, Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, and Pareto, but could lose Transitivity.107 This is incorrect.
First, this Article explains the consequences of relaxing Transitivity and
the next section dissects the repercussions of relaxing Independence.
To only relax Transitivity, appellate courts would make decisions
like the following example. Assume Profile 7 of Figure 2 from Part II
results in the arbitrary decision that the conflict between y and z will be
ranked in favor of y (the same arbitrary decision made earlier). Now,
assume both Marshall and Taney (Profile 9) unanimously rank z ahead of
x. Transitivity should force outcome yzx from yz (an outcome derived
from Independence) with zx (from Pareto). Relaxing Transitivity is a way
to prevent A from being the dictator, but may lead to xyz.108 That is, if z is
105

Even with one-word responses on appeals subjective bargains would still exist in
the background. For example, consider First Amendment obscenity appeals which were
either “reversed” or “affirmed.” One judge may have focused on the original intent of the
Framers while another applied a “living constitution” interpretation. Such answers are not
known and thus, limiting range serves little purpose.
106
For more on the complexities of the path-dependence issue, see Stearns, supra note
101.
107
Id.
108
See Hansen, supra note 17, at 222 (“In general . . . when a value judgment that
corresponds to neither individual’s ranking is initially imposed (thereby immediately
ruling out a dictatorship), it is impossible to socially order all thirty-six preference
profiles because of an inevitable intransitivity.”); Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44, at 5
(providing an Arrovian example where only transitivity is relaxed, while the remaining
four assumptions hold). Note that Pareto is violated in this example as well.
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preferred to x for every profile, and x preferred over y, how and when
does a decision making mechanism determine when, precisely, zPxPy
will not be the preferred outcome? Why do this for Profile 9 and not
another profile? Making this choice for another profile would be just as
legitimate as doing this in Profile 9 because it would be just as arbitrary.
Such an outcome can never be predictable.109
In Easterbrook’s analysis, relaxing transitivity led to inconsistent
adjudication, and this was a negative but inexorable result. While a
dictatorship is immediately precluded with this choice, jurisprudence
theorists should find this is too costly a price—especially since there is
an alternative without this cost.110
Before arguing why relaxing Independence is the solution for
appellate decisions, this Article discusses why not simply relaxing the
“Completeness” element of Transitivity is ineffective. The problem with
this argument is determining when the situation occurs, without any
definable objective mechanism. Like any attempt to limit Range with the
standing or Chevron doctrines,111 the intractable issue is how to
determine which cases would qualify. The crux of this Article is the
assertion that there is no objective algorithm, according to the Arrovian
proof, for determining how and when judges would know to consider
certain options. It is itself another Arrovian group problem. Therefore,
relaxing the “Completeness” characteristic inherent in Transitivity is a
result beyond the pale of possibility.
109
Mueller offered an oligarchy as the means to provide some stability in this
situation. His solution was to empower a select few to make arbitrary decisions.
However, determining how to pick these individuals is an intractable problem. In
addition, it is difficult to enforce arbitrary powers. Again, society presumably desires to
avoid constitutional protections against the arbitrary effects of lawmaking. That the “king
[or oligarchy] can do no wrong” is not currently part of our accepted democratic ideals.
110
“[A]s Lon Fuller maintained, knowing what the law is and knowing how to
comply are necessary conditions for legality itself.” Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 482 (2000)
(citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. Yale U. Press 1969)). “John
Marshall’s claim is nothing less than the observation, later refined by Fuller, that without
a single and authoritative interpreter there would be little difference between law and the
numerous non-enforced directives we find in philosophy books and advice columns.” Id.
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 266 (Aspen Publishers 2003)
(quoting HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., The Lawbook
Exchange, LTD. 2002) (1967); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237–39 (Oxford
University Press 1971)).
111
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Justice Stevens reasoned, “when a challenge to an agency construction . . . really centers
on the wisdom of an agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within
a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those
who do.” Id.
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In sum, deciding in which cases Transitivity should not apply is
itself a communal decision subject to Arrow’s proof. Therefore, any
attempt in this vein is dismissed. Completeness is a necessary
characteristic of the appellate court decisionmaking process.
Consequently, Pareto, Non-dictatorship, Range, and Transitivity may not
be relaxed in an appellate court decision-making mechanism. The Article
now considers the Independence assumption.
D. Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Bargaining is
Positively Necessary, and Normatively Acceptable
In review, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives characteristic
has two elements. Independence imposes both (1) a restriction on
changing outcomes due to a change in choice sets, and (2) an initial
assumption that a group’s members bargain ordinally rather than
cardinally.112 Relaxing Independence immediately refutes both
characteristics—there is no part-ordinal, part-cardinal means of ranking
choices. This provides the most palatable and practical answer to the
judiciary’s Arrovian decision. In fact, Independence must be relaxed for
appellate courts to function.
1. Process of Elimination: Majority Rule Fails Unless Independence
is Relaxed
First, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is the suspect
axiom by process of elimination, as the preceding sections show. Range
can never truly be limited to two jurisprudential methods in any single
case. Relaxing the Non-dictatorship principle, Pareto, or Transitivity
would lead to decisions society would not tolerate. One person cannot
control an appellate court’s decisions, which would occur if Nondictatorship were relaxed. Any group decision must be subject to
majority rule, which is destroyed if Pareto or Transitivity is relaxed. If
the notion of majority rule losing to a minority’s votes (something that
must occur at unpredictable and arbitrary times) is rejected, then one has
to acknowledge that Independence is the axiom relaxed.
2. Majority Rule Survives if Independence is Relaxed
The “intuition” at the heart of Hanson’s graphical illustration of
Arrow’s proof in Part II indicated that among two persons choosing
between three options, only one single arbitrary decision (from Profile 7,
for example) would “trickle-down” in all thirty-six preference profiles.
The example led to a complete solution for the entire puzzle. After all of
112

See Tabarrok, supra note 52, at 8–9.
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the boxes were filled in, the Article noted that one of the two individuals’
preferences coincidentally matched every outcome. This occurred due to
the four assumptions of Pareto, Range, Transitivity, and most
importantly, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The result was that
an Arrovian dictator existed, showing that the fifth assumption of Nondictatorship was violated.
In an appellate court, even among a large number of options
(originalism, textualism, Dworkinism, pragmatism, etc.), only one
arbitrary decision would be needed to “trickle-down.” There are always
more than three choices in a jurisprudential decision-making scenario.
The vast power of the Independence assumption is crucial. An alternative
means of understanding this proof derives from Feldman and Serrano’s
analysis: since three judges could potentially choose three outcomes of a
Condorcet Paradox, and Completeness demands an outcome, one of the
judges must “win” even though no majority would choose that judge’s
preferences. The result from either point of view is the same—to prevent
the Arrovian dictator, one must relax an assumption. That assumption
must be the Independence assumption.
To relax Independence, the possibility of an “ordinal” ranking of
preferences is lost, and cardinal preferences are used instead. The
practical effect of this solution is that judges signal and exert intensities
of their preferences, finalizing their demands through cardinal bargains.
Appellate bodies resolve their differences among jurisprudential theories
in this way. Whether the approach is originalist, Dworkinian, or
pragmatist, the issues for resolution are the same. Coherent decisions are
allowed after bargains among positions coalesce into a majority, and
majority rule triumphs.
Again, cardinal bargaining means that individuals make the group
decision by opining and contracting on the importance of their opinions.
It is the relationship between an individual judge’s impression of the
importance of his own opinion and the convictions of other judges that
controls the outcome. Since no objective means exists to “normalize”113
the different impressions, each judge says what the law is because the
judge says so. This syllogism at the heart of the interaction among
appellate judges is to use power. Even if the law-reader/judge attempts to
objectively ascertain the “Rule of Law,” it is the resultant interaction
between the judges, comprised of subjective determinations, that leads to
a final adjudication.

113
To normalize here would be to conform individual preferences to a certain
standard so that they may be weighed against each other. No method exists to ascertain
each individual’s benefits in an objective manner.

344

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:303

These subjective determinations are anathema to the liberal project,
under which judges purportedly ascertain and apply the rule of law to
objectively control each case. Rather, multimember courts create the law
through personal predilections. They do not “apply” the law as if it could
be objectively ascertained. Individual determinations invade each
adjudication. All adjudication truly results from this “active” judicial
role.
Stearns’s Range problems are satisfied. Among more than three
issues, a compromise is reached on one outcome, albeit at times by the
narrow margins of one vote. Easterbrook should be satisfied with this
solution, as well. Easterbrook has stated that arbitrary precedents arise
due to path dependence, creating a general incoherence in the law.114
This would, indeed, be the consequence if Transitivity were relaxed.
However, instead of the arbitrariness problem Easterbrook poses due to
relaxing Transitivity, majorities—even narrow ones—are created by
relaxing Independence instead. Neither textualism nor intentionalism
(nor “formalism”) provides an answer as successful as this. Rather, as
mentioned above, even members agreeing on the same jurisprudential
theory may still disagree when voting, which means only appointment or
arbitrary election of a “dictator” would suffice for intentionalist or
textualist theories.
How would the ideal originalist, for example, find legislative
intent? Should he use legislative history? Or use committee comments
only, since the committee was the “expert”? What about conversations
between the swing-vote Senator and the Senator’s husband?115
Compromise is the critical role for the judge in the Rule of Law.
Easterbrook posited that the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives criterion means the determination of a case about the Eighth
Amendment should not be influenced by a judge’s beliefs about the
negligence system, or “that plaintiffs with red hair (or black skin) ought
to lose.”116 This Article maintains that Independence is extremely
restrictive when one arbitrary decision “trickles down” in the Arrovian
proof. This will mean it is impossible to objectively apply a rule that
decides whether an issue is “red-haired” versus “relevant.”
Easterbrook stated, “In any judicial system, irrelevant alternatives
must be disregarded. Logrolling, one way of handling intensity of
preferences about ‘extraneous’ matters in legislative systems, is excluded

114

See supra notes 20, 85, 86.
See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 100 HARV L. REV. 1166 (1987).
116
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 825–
26 (1982).
115
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. . . .”117 Here, Easterbrook makes an incorrect inference about
Independence. It is wrong to dismiss an “irrelevant” alternative this way.
Rather, logrolling, of a sort, is not excluded from appellate adjudication
by simply dismissing the “unreasonable” alternatives.
To illustrate the problem with this consideration of “irrelevance,”
consider the prior examples involving the 1992 and 2000 U.S.
presidential elections and cycles among chocolate, vanilla, and
strawberry. While red hair or beliefs about negligence seem to have little
to do with an Eighth Amendment case, what about originalism,
textualism, and pragmatism (to say nothing of a coherent theory of stare
decisis, or the differences among originalists, textualists and
Dworkinists)? This is the critical point: there is no clear way to disregard
myriad alternatives as “irrelevant.”
No issue or alternative is irrelevant just because it will not be the
victor in a case. Neither Ross Perot nor Ralph Nader nor strawberry is
irrelevant, but these would be dismissed under the “red hair” analogy.
Irrelevance does not mean a “losing conviction” or “losing premise.”
Irrelevance is not an empowerment to dismiss a myriad of persuasive
factual points in a case, “pure” textual interpretations of a statute or
constitution, or versions of “neutral principles.” Further, the attempt to
carve the relevant out of a “reasonableness” principle does not prevent a
lack of steadfast and objective boundaries to the interpretation. The result
is that a judge must weigh, and ultimately prefer, in varying degrees,
different options based on the subjective.
One “irrelevant” originalist position in a simplified example
invoves a panel is dealing with a case where only one judge or justice
takes an originalist position. Assume the remaining eight are evenly split
(4-4) between one single, unified, and homogeneous textualist
interpretation of the case, and one single, unified, and homogeneous
pragmatic position. Easterbrook’s explanation of the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption is impermissible because there is no
clear stopping point between the judge’s originalist convictions and the
importance of a litigant’s red hair.
If the judge’s intensity of conviction leads him to believe one
position or the other is the better outcome for his jurisprudence, then his
originalist belief results in the deciding vote. It is not necessary that his
pragmatic theories influence the case, but they may be a factor. The same
factors influence the judge’s “intentionalist” views. The outcome perhaps
unites four judges, who, instead of writing a watershed pragmatic

117

Id.
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opinion, write a compromise that takes account of the intersection of
originalism and pragmatic theory.
This demonstrates that the bargain struck was between intensities of
preferences, resulting in a final interpretation between different ideals.
The bargain was not a vote among deep, homogeneous, and clear
interpretations from different but discrete single schools of
jurisprudence.
There is no objective standard available to discern when a
jurisprudential theory or factor becomes classified as “red-haired.”118
Rather, the litigants themselves receive different interpretations based on
varying presumptions in different situations.119 In the ice cream
adjudication example, the judges use differing amounts of chocolate,
vanilla, and strawberry in the interpretation. In reality, there would be
numerous interpretations of each flavor, thus more thoroughly blending
the jurisprudential compromise.
Only where Independence is relaxed do judges consider these
issues in a subjective manner, effectively contracting among their

118
The “vehicles in the park” problem lies here—it is an intractable problem without
an answer, as shown by the Arrovian analysis. It is a useful pedagogical hypothetical
because it can never be solved. For a real-life version of the “vehicles in the park”
problem, consider a law prohibiting buildings “other than one detached single-family
dwelling.” Does this bar a children’s playhouse? See Traylor v. Holloway, 142 S.E.2d
521, 523 (Va. 1965) (yes). A concrete doghouse? See Univ. Gardens Prop. Owners
Assoc. v. Solomon, 88 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (yes). A wire-mesh cage on a
concrete floor designed as a pen for two pet cougars? See Turidic v. Stephens, 31 P.3d
465 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (no, because this was a permissible “residential use”). A parking
lot and menu board for a drive-in Burger King restaurant? See 5011 Cmty. Org. v.
Harris, 548 A.2d 9 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (no, these are not “buildings”). The Idaho
Supreme Court suggested the principle of free use of land should guide judges when
judges find ambiguity. Pinehaven Planning Bd v. Brooks, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (Idaho 2003).
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 553 (3d ed. 2005).
The original “vehicles in the park” problem is taken from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 125–26 (1961). For a report on a judge’s role in deciding whether the social utility
should affect the outcome of the case, see BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 48 (Berkeley Books
1999) (reporting that after the judge took an injured baby in his arms at a pretrial
conference, the judge stated “This woman needs some money”).
119
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS, 292–93
(3d ed. 2005) (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1978))
(providing a public entity with a more favorable version of the state’s “unnecessary
hardship” zoning test than other uses); and Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment, 603 A.2d 30 (N.J.
1992) (providing a for-profit senior citizen care facility with more favorable treatment in
the state’s “inherently beneficial” zoning constraint test than for other uses). See also
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (striking down racial covenants as violative of public
policy).
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preferences.120 Consequently, judges may, and indeed do, consider
litigants’ characteristics free from any objective restrictions.
Another consequence of not relaxing Independence is that if judges
are prevented from cardinal bargaining, there is no guarantee that a panel
avoid a Condorcet cycling problem. In Arrovian terms, Range is always
much larger than the simple three-choice example in Part II.121 Assume,
however, that there are only three choices. If the three judges prefer the
following choices, the ordinal preferences lead to no winner, and no
loser.122
Judge
Ben
Jerry
Carvel

Rank:

1st
c
v
s

2nd
v
s
c

3rd
s
c
v

Figure 5
How could judges decide cases without intensity-preferences?123 In
a Condorcet cycling situation there would be no panel adjudication.
Further, without cardinality, as seen in the example of agenda control, a
panel using ordinal rankings will eventually result in an arbitrary
outcome that no majority would choose.124 These examples should
120
To see the compromise most clearly, note that judicial opinions are not typically
answered with a simple “affirmed” or “reversed” conclusion, but with a rationale. This
rationale is a compromise and cannot be predicted.
121
But see Stearns, supra note 101, at 1065 (arguing that the number of “genuine”
legal issues in a case, which are part of the necessary disposition of a case, are “fairly
stable and small”).
122
See Figure 5.
123
This Article notes that it is “erroneous[] [to presume] that the ‘median Justice’
wields the bulk of the Court’s power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from
clear whether he would be the Most Dangerous Justice.” Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen,
“Duel” Diligence: Second Thoughts about the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S.
CAL. L REV. 219 (1996). Edelman and Chen offer a mathematical indexing of Justices
and apply the index and a median voter theorem to conclude that Justice O’Connor did
not wield more than a proportional one-ninth share of decision-making—in fact it was
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg in two respective Court terms. The article concludes that
power does not derive from being the median voter. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The
Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 63 (1996).
124
For articles on the conflict between strategic vote-switching and stare decisis in
action, see, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999) (arguing against complete deference to the judicial branch’s
opinion on Constitutional interpretation because courts decide cases rather than
pronounce the law, and may get it wrong due to their multimember make-up); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991) (considering the tension from stare decisis, alleged
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illustrate that judges must individually bargain about how this principle
is “[some degree]” more important than that principle.
Arrow’s Proof thus shows that jurisprudential methods purporting
to restrict judges are inadequate. The “Independence” assumption cannot
be allowed to exert its force in a group decision. If it did, the use of
majority rule in courts fails.
3. Majority Rule: An Illegitimate Strategy?
Easterbrook and others assert that strategy in appellate court
adjudication is illegitimate.125 This Article takes an opposing position.
stability, and the problems for judges and theorists who attempt adhere to some unifying
principle); Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 643 (2002) (arguing the traditional practice of tie votes affirming the court
below is correct because mischief could ensue in the creation of an opinion resolved by a
plurality). Hartnett cites Stearns’ suggestion that the deliberations for Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 1060 (2000) may have faced a judgment impasse if a plurality would have carried
the day, as four Justices favored remand. Id. at 670. Stearns and Abramowicz speculated
that Justices Souter and Breyer failed to convince either Justices Kennedy or O’Connor to
switch to a meaningful remand, thus collapsing the possibility of affirmance and forming
a majority outcome where the three favoring reversal switched to an empty remand.
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political
Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1947–50 (2001). These authors
suggested “[the] Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas accepted Bush’s equal
protection argument and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy did not reach Bush’s Article II
argument in order to avoid revealing the paradox of Bush winning the judgment even
though he lost each issue.” Hartnett, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. at n.96. As an example of
a desire to change the law through personal conviction, or perhaps alternatively, as an
example of a changed determination of what the Rule of Law requires, see Callins v.
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1154–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding the death
penalty unconstitutional and vowing to join Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., in dissent to
every capital case thereafter).
125
Despite all earnestness with which Supreme Court Justices and their clerks
perform their duties, one fatal flaw dooms the Court’s decisionmaking process to
permanent incoherence and indeterminacy. Like any legislature, the Court makes
collective decisions. Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theory, launched to expose the folly
in attributing consistency and rationality to legislative voting, has surprisingly left the
judiciary almost unscathed. The academy almost adheres to a fantasy of an almighty,
perfectly rational Court that operates in some nonexistent legal nirvana—“almost” . . .
because Judge Easterbrook authoritatively demonstrated how the Court’s collective
decisions will stay inconsistent. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial
Power, 59 MO. L. REV. 281, 297–98 (1994) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 814–23 (1982)). Chen incorrectly concludes
that “the application of public choice theory to judicial decisionmaking suggests that the
most important factors in any Supreme Court case may never explicitly appear [in the
U.S. Reports]. . . . [A]ny imaginable rule can emerge from the Court [with the right
catalyst, human or not human].” Id. at 299. “Arrow’s theory confirms this descent into
chaos—this swan dive propelled by the ‘material self-interest of the judges’—is
inexorable and irreversible.” Id. at 298. This Article suggests that Chen and Easterbrook
carry Arrow’s proof too far. First, Farber’s 2D map metaphor offers some insight into the
misunderstanding. The position that Arrovian criteria renders any attempt at cohesiveness
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Easterbrook concluded Arrow leaves one option: relax Transitivity, and
accept its inevitably arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes. A better answer
is to relax Independence, and acknowledge that judges may assert
intensity preferences. Relaxing Independence in favor of subjective
cardinal bargaining (and majority rule) guarantees a statutory
interpretation result in an adjudicated case. While the idea that judges
objectively “apply” the Rule of Law is lost, the potential to make a single
coherent decision in every case is gained. Further, the bargaining does
not invoke concerns with the jurisprudential process.
Judges need not rank preferences in an ordinal sequence. Rather,
intensities can and should be used. When an appellate court makes a
decision, the foresight of the judges is crucial. The judicial query “How
will this decision affect the next case?” anticipates future cases as if a
judge were making a contract with a future court’s interpretation of a
present adjudication.126 While this is magnified most obviously by
Supreme Court holdings, the analysis applies at all state and federal
appellate bodies. Judges make subjective decisions when selecting
between approaches for legal interpretations.
Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager note that strategic behavior
for judging seems implicitly pejorative, but assert that in truth, it is the
norm for judges to sacrifice details of their subjective beliefs in the
service of producing an outcome and opinion attributable to the court.127
Simply, sometimes judges will switch votes because of their priorities
among different methods of jurisprudential decision-making. However,
this Article argues that bargaining is necessary in every single case.
This Article does not contend that filibusters or log-rolling must
occur as patently as within a legislature.128 The tradeoff, “I’ll vote for
your views on Smith v. Jones if you vote for me in Marbury v. Madison,”
is not required to relax Independence. Nor does bargaining require a
useless is not persuasive because Independence may be relaxed. Further, Hansen’s
explanation shows there is little to be said by Arrow. It is simply a puzzle proving one
fact, but when the rules are relaxed the anathema result is removed as well.
126
“The existence of cycles influences the way judges write their opinions. . . . [I]t is
important for each group of judges to write separately in order to preserve its options for
the next round of cases.” Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and
Limitation of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 840–41 (1990) (citing
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982)).
127
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication
in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL L. REV. 1, 52–53 (1993).
128
Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999) (considering whether a judge may appropriately engage in
strategic behavior). Caminker argues that strategic vote trading may further legitimate
judicial objectives, but is not clearly so beneficial as to withstand against objections
suggesting that it is improper judicial behavior. Id. at 2380 (concluding that there is no
clear answer yet).
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financial benefit traded for votes. Instead, Independence is sufficiently
relaxed by the simple replacement of ordinal preferences with cardinal
preferences.
Cardinal bargaining is essentially represented as, “How strongly, on
whatever subjective scale you choose, do you, your Honor, care about
how to conclude the Smith case?” Johnathan Nash cites the strategy in
multimember courts to offer an example of what Nash calls the “stopping
rule.”129 This phenomenon exists where a court explaining a new rule of
law deliberately refuses to identify distinct elements of a test, and instead
provides for a “balancing test.” One view of such action is that the court
allows tensions in the choice of voting protocols to percolate.
Alternatively, the court may decide between a desire to adjudicate with
“issue voting” or with “outcome voting.” Either way, the judges
comprising the majority strike a judicial bargain.130
Consider a 2-1 opinion in an appellate court that distinguishes
relevant precedent “on the facts.” Alternatively, consider a 2-1 opinion
including a balancing test. Such a bargain, although merely a balancing
test and not a conclusive and clear “per se” rule, might seem to provide
more predictability than an outcome where a three-member court writes a
“per curiam” opinion, a concurrence, and a dissent.131 Predictability in
the law does not exist because judges apply an objective Rule of Law. In
every subsequent case, the appellate court bargains over the precedent set
below, re-interpreting the case, statute, or constitutional issues that
surface within the suit. Bargaining occurs whether the precedent is a 2-1
adjudication or an en banc 11-0 decision. The interpretation is subjective.
The fear is that perhaps judges could take strategies too far.
Kornhauser and Sager suggest that a judge may “cross the line” if a
judge “disingenuously joins an opinion dismissing a case on justiciability
. . . to avoid an outcome on the merits she regards as unjust.”132 The
129

Johnathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 158–59 (2003) (recommending en banc
reviews to limit the doctrinal paradox).
130
Id.
131
For another example of judicial bargaining over the direction of antitrust law, see
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court: Perspectives
from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 93, 97–99 (1997). For an
example of a judge who arguably changed his mind about an originalist position, see
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that marijuana
“grown at home and possessed for personal use [is commerce among the states, partly
because it is] never more than an instant from the interstate market . . . .”).
132
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court:
Perspectives from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 93, 97–99
(1997). As an example of bargaining at or near the line, Evan Caminker cites Justice
Brennan’s position in Craig v. Boren, finding that statutory or administrative sex
classifications were subject to intermediate scrutiny, as a strategic vote to establish a
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concern is understandable from the law-reader as the law-giver, but there
is no objective mechanism in interpretation prohibiting such conduct.
4. The Goal is a Decision
Individual preferences between judges are necessary for appellate
court adjudication, so legislative intent alone cannot be the only source
fueling interpretations. Rather, as critical legal scholars posit, the Rule of
Law depends on the personal and jurisprudential philosophies the judges
bring to deliberations.133
This does not undermine the law if courts are properly considered.
Though the liberal project must fail, it is not a tragedy since
jurisprudential compromises should not be considered awkward or
suspicious.
If judges on a court must bargain to avoid Arrovian problems, they
use subjective guidance to provide transitivity and coherence to
adjudication. But if the alternative is that preferences from a minority of
judges control over a majority, the alternative is no longer feasible. Yet
this would occur if Pareto were relaxed. Even less promising, if Nondictatorship were relaxed, only one vote would be necessary to defeat all
other votes. However, even this scenario does not comprise the ultimate
decision-making failure. The worst option is to relax Transitivity, where
at times all persons could vote the same way but could produce an
outcome in which the victor is not based on any votes cast. Such
incoherence in adjudication is resolved when Independence is relaxed.
Each judge identifies the principles of meaning for a statute, judicial
“durable precedent for intermediate scrutiny rather than voting sincerely for strict
scrutiny.” Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember
Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2380 (1999) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976)). Compromises between personal, watershed desires and actual outcomes abound
in Constitutional Law. For example, Justice Black’s stance on freedom of speech; Justice
Brennan on equal protection; see also Justice Scalia’s approach to the Commerce Clause
using originalism in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
133
See Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); Paul
Martin et al., Of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1–26 (1985)
(debating the usefulness of critical legal studies, nihilism, and the Rule of Law). See also
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 381
(1989) (noting Judge Calabresi’s suggestion that courts should constantly examine
current legal developments, but also current social, economic, moral, and political
values). For an additional example, Maxwell Chibundu suggests that legal ideas can be
derived from “without law” and are “legal” by virtue of translation into practice of law.
His “applied structuralism” approach considers background context, similar to Dworkin’s
method, and applies this as a limitation to interpretation. Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure
and Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1443, 1492–
94 (1994). However, such subjective considerations do not show how one would or
should interpret a statute, constitution, or prior case law.
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opinion, or basic values through personal predilections. This adjudicative
use is based on personal power, but is necessary.134
How may a judge wield this power in light of the “degradation
ceremony” and what Tushnet calls society’s “deep assumptions prevalent
in our culture?” The question is whether strategy is inappropriate.
Michael Wells has suggested that “[i]ntegrity in adjudication is not
necessarily abandoned with strategic bargaining.”135 Initially, this may
not seem to lead to predictable processes. However, communal
adjudication cannot be expected to be 100% predictable since it depends
on subjective human desires. This becomes apparent upon acceptance
that the law changes when the members of the judiciary shift.
Empirical studies confirm that appellate courts do make policy
judgments based on political inclinations.136 As anecdotal evidence of
this, one Justice famously asked his law clerks “What [is] the most
important thing to know about the Supreme Court?” The Justice “would
pause, then hold up his five fingers and explain that five votes enable a
Justice to do anything.”137 This transforms the judge/law-reader into the
134
See William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 765 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1425 (1988) (citing stare decisis as a dynamic issue which the Court continues to grapple
with, and suggesting it is sometimes beneficial to be “dynamic,” even if that results in the
need to contradict express statutory language).
135
Wells, M., Busting the Hart & Weschler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557,
579 (1995) (discussing integrity, Dworkinism, and the coherence of the courts).
136
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV 1717 (1997) (finding empirical evidence that judges’ personal
policy judgments do intrude into the Rule of Law in the D.C. Circuit); Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST.
L. J. 1635 (1998) (demonstrating through mathematical modeling that circuit judges
behave according to “attitudinal” models and “strategic” models); Sanford Levinson, Law
as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982) (cautioning that there is no Rule of Law,
only power, then likening judicial decision-making to the interpretation of literature to
conclude that there may be no limits to judicial proclivities).
137
Panel Discussion: Remembering a Constitutional Hero, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
13, 21 (1999); Jim Chen, Correspondence: A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional
Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1799 (2004).
See also James F. Simon, Dialogue: Speech: Politics and the Rehnquist Court, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 863, 875 (1996) (discussing that, alternatively, this may have been an
explanation for how the Supreme Court makes erroneous decisions, as this may more
often have occurred “[e]arly in a term, usually after one of Justice Brennan’s new law
clerks had raged over a hopelessly wrongheaded majority opinion by one of Justice
Brennan’s more conservative colleagues. . . .”); Transcript: Looking Back on Penn
Central: A Panel Discussion with the Supreme Court Litigators, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL.
LAW REV., 287, 307 (2004) (recounting how in a conversation about the Penn Central
takings case, a former law clerk explained his role and his perception of the Justice’s role:
“[F]rom a law clerk’s perspective, the main importance of oral argument was that it was
an opportunity to get a sense of what the other Justices thought. [The former clerk then
explained legal disputes he would eventually write about in the opinion]” and discussing
the writing of the actual opinion: “But I was trying very hard really to hold the Court, that
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law-giver if he or she is shifting the law one way or another based on
bargains.138
In response to nihilist inferences that may mistakenly surface in this
Article, there is nothing fundamentally flawed or “wrong” with the
conclusion that law may not be “applied.” Rather, properly internalized
and expected by the public, politicians, and judges, this analysis shows
what the appellate judiciary is useful for, and what it is not. An appellate
court may provide a “reasonable” interpretation of any text, may assert a
compromise indicating a reasonable analysis of what “legislative intent”
was found, and what that intent is, or even make an “unreasonable”
decision about a new course of the law.139 Under the Arrovian decisionmaking mechanism, the “unreasonable,” jurisprudentially speaking, is
just as legitimate an adjudication as a “reasonable” decision. Majority
rule is followed. No guidance may be found before a case is decided by
any objective “science of interpretation,” and this should be
acknowledged.
Concededly, judges do make decisions based on power rather with
an objective metric. Even the contracts that may exist between judges
and future adjudicators cannot prohibit, on any clear jurisprudential
principle, an unintended re-interpretation. If the judiciary receives
was the number one objective when you were working on an opinion for [the Justice], to
produce an opinion that at least five Justices would join that would hold the Court.”).
138
For a critique against using Arrow in the manner applied in this Article, Richard
Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson argue against applying Arrow to the law. These authors
posit that Arrow, and social choice theory in general, are simply “irrelevant” to
democratic values because “the values people care about . . . are plural and often
incommensurable [and therefore] cannot be expressed adequately through consistent
preference rankings over outcomes described in the sparse terms available to social
choice theory.” Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2142 (1990). Pildes and Anderson suggest that public choice is
specifically useless regarding incommensurable values of “forming a more perfect
Union,” and “securing blessings of liberty” as ideals incapable of being restricted to
consequentialist preference rankings. Id. at 2146. This Article disagrees with their
implicit assumptions. Arrow does not attempt to restrict the search for a “more perfect
Union” or “liberty,” nor free speech or equal protection. Rather, Arrow presented a
cooperation problem. When a statute is presented, voted upon, and passed, it may have
specific aspects such as time limits, quotas, or concepts that must be interpreted. There
are indeed democratic principles at work, but without some boundaries, cases could not
be decided. Their assertions are too amorphous to apply as a constructive critique of
social choice and thus this Article suggests their argument should be dismissed.
139
See generally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that the
“actual malice” standard protects libel defendants), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(finding most laws against abortion violate constitutional privacy protections), Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (finding that a constitution
does not embody a particular economic theory); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(delineating constitutional protections for criminal defendants).
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support because society assumes the law is applied objectively, and this
is the source of legitimate adjudications, injunctions, and judgments,
society places its expectations on an empty concept. If it is “wrong” to
allow judges to bargain, it should be regarded as equally wrong, if not
irrational, to expect the mathematically impossible.
This Article argues that society must acknowledge how judges
bargain to escape the Arrovian proof. It is the severity of the proof put
forth in this Article that provides legitimacy for the use of cardinal
preferences.
V. SUBJECTIVE USE OF A POWERFUL POSITION FORMS THE
“RULE OF LAW”
A. Review
This Article concludes that the law-reader is the law-giver in
appellate courts. Though the claim is not new, the proof offered is novel.
Colin Diver, Sanford Levinson, and many others have stated that
statutory interpretation, like literary interpretation, is “unavoidably an act
of creating meaning. The very choice of principles by which the search
for meaning is to be guided stamps the interpreter’s personality indelibly
on the outcome of the inquiry.”140 This Article is distinguishable from
Diver, Levinson, and others not because it disagrees with this notion, but
because it shows the severe mathematical need for these personal choices
by appellate judges. Unlike Levinson, the argument does not makes its
assertion based on experience; rather, it derives its strength from an
important and strict mathematical proof. The discretion of appellate
judges allows coherence to exist in judgments; without it, important
ethical norms fail and judicial dictators or mathematically arbitrary
outcomes would exist.
The consequence is that the appellate courts’ voting mechanism for
adjudication is not restrictive. As Henry Hart stated, judges serve to
reasonably interpret legislators, who in turn are “reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”141 This is not more restrictive
or helpful than using the guidance of “political morality.”142 Appellate
adjudication is a continuing argument that morphs based on the powers
and political morality wielded by judges. This opens the debate to the
140

Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 582–83 (1985). See also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV.
373, 391 (1982).
141
HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (10th ed. 1958).
142
Scalia, supra note 9.
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“science of interpretation,” and some may find this problematic. What
principles pose to a judge, a “cost” or “benefit” within the realm of his
personal jurisprudential viewpoint to influence the outcome of the instant
case? How does a specific group of judges view a cost-benefit analysis
range in any specific case? Judges must bargain over which principles to
employ on a case by case basis, wielding subjective preferences to
analyze text, intent, or a “living constitution” concept, all framed by
restrictions from precedent. The imposition of “precedent” is itself
analyzed through subjective preferences, and is always susceptible to the
bargains that accompany upcoming cases on the docket.
B. Contracts and Stare Decisis: This Court and the Next
The proclivities of appellate judges are paramount in adjudication
since objective correctness can never be achieved.143 The fear, however,
143
Notably, even the controversial area of judicial lawmaking has support from the
American people and Congress. See RALPH E. SHAFFER, THE BORK HEARINGS:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLE IN U.S.
HISTORY 29 (Markus Wiener Publications 2005). For example, Senator Specter, during
the Bork Hearings, stated:
I do not disagree with your interpretation of antitrust law, and I do not intend to
pursue it any further. The limited point that I seek to make here on antitrust
laws is the difficulty of finding congressional intent and the wide range of
judicial discretion which necessarily applies. The practical effect of a judge’s
role is to apply that discretion and not to be able to really find what legislators’
[sic] intend, and to try and make some sense out of what a judge may conclude
to be a pernicious law, and to try to make some sense out of conflicting
statements in the Congressional Record. A judge’s role is to really try to pull
the whole picture together, and that is the tradition of the law, and I think
appropriately so. . . . But I do think as you apply that beyond the antitrust field,
into other legislative lines and into constitutional lines, there is a broader,
traditional role of the judge in applying values to the needs of the nation
beyond what you can find in some specific intent.
Id. (emphasis added).
However, Judge Bork stated:
If I were a legislator, I would clearly vote for the smoke pollution ordinance
and I would vote against the anti-contraceptive ordinance, and as a citizen I
would oppose the anti-contraceptive statute and I would vote for the smoke
pollution statutes. … The judge may not have a hierarchy of values that does
not come from the Constitution. He may not say to a consumer: ‘You value
your low-cost electricity, but that’s an ignoble value, whereas the other is a
noble value’ unless the Constitution tells him to make that choice. . . . That is
the only reason I say the judge has no way to tell those two cases apart if the
Constitution does not speak.
Id. at 93.
Bork concluded that the difference between elected representatives and unelected judges
is something society fails to respect. Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and
Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 19 (2003). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (invalidating legislation seeking to benefit the poor,
workers, or other social groups by interfering with individuals’ freedom to contract and
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involves any single judge emphasizing principle x as important even
though it may not be important for all.144 One may demand Tushnet’s
“socialization” because of suspicion toward the arbitrary, to foster
predictability. Richard Epstein comments, “[w]here there is some
awkward compromise and accommodation, there is little to keep the
purist in us happy” and, “[l]ike Caesar’s wife and baseball umpires, a
judge must be above suspicion” [of bias, whence the danger of
socializing with lawyers or of judging cases where the judge has
financial interest, etc.]”145
However, even more essential than predictability is the
foundational requirement of simple coherence. This Article demonstrates
that the solution to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is to relax an
assumption to create coherence in adjudication. To suggest any other
restriction that cannot be as restrictive as the Independence assumption is
to ask a judicial body to interpret a law, regulation, or perhaps an “ethical
code” purporting to guide it. Judges cannot stay objective because this
mechanism of restricting themselves is also subject to Arrow’s Proof.
The appellate body cannot objectively apply the background control. In
sum, alternatives cannot restrict the decision-making process once
Independence is relaxed.
The last potential restriction available to perhaps save the liberal
project is the notion that judges contract to interpret. After dismissing the
possible use of this restriction in the following section, the Article
examines stare decisis.
1. Are Contracts the Answer? No.
Suppose judges attempt to interpret not through objectivity, but by
actually attempting to contract with one another? Perhaps this approach
individual property rights). See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional and vowing to join
Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., in dissent to every capital case thereafter).
144
This is a critique of substantive due process. See e.g., Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage laws for women and
children); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (finding
“a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire”);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding no
Constitutional power to protect “liberty of the person both in its special and more
transcendent dimensions.”). This social utility problem is illustrated by the problems of
determining which groups should be protected as minorities and how to discern the
guiding principle for that query. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that the anti-majoritarian guide is the principle for protecting
“discrete and insular minorities”).
145
Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of
Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834, 855 (1990).
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might suffice for society’s views of appellate legitimacy. Judges would
enter contracts with future judges via single adjudications, in order to
interpret the law. In this vein, judges would consider past bilateral as part
of their subjective preferences. 146
Yet each case will still demand compromises among a wide field of
equally legitimate possibilities under textualism. It will also create the
mathematical inability to determine whether an objectively correct
adjudication accords with any interpretive mechanism, including
intentionalism. If judges prefer to hold themselves to bargains from the
past, the argument would demand a formulation of some semblance of
predictability. Independence would sufficiently be relaxed, because an
objective standard was not attempted. However, a personal preference to
uphold a former contract is simply one of many options available to each
judge.
The same problem corresponding to textualism and intentionalism
surfaces in this instance.147 A judge’s attempt to read the intent of the
“old contract” of a prior adjudication (precedent) is subject to the
Arrovian problem at the heart of this Article. The result is that
contracting forfeits an objective standard. This still fails to provide an
“apply-able” mechanism in interpretation. Furthermore, contentious
issues pose complexities. How does one contract in the face of changing
social mores and expectations? Consider Justice Brennan’s “fivefingered approach” to adjudication as an example of the power of one
vote.148
In the end, the imperative use of the subjective illustrates why
appellate courts so often seem to struggle when dealing with our nation’s
important cultural issues, federal and state powers battles, and statutory
interpretations. This is not to say that an attempt to promote fidelity with
the past is futile. Rather, the attempt is simply one preference to be
compared with textualism, pragmatism, Dworkinism, etc., because all
potentially provide a determination of “reasonableness,” which is the true
high watermark for interpretation, without an objective restriction.
146

Nicholas Zeppos stated that “if the motivations and intentions of the legislature are
impossible to discern, it seems equally probable that it is also impossible to extract the
‘real’ motivations of our often inscrutable courts.” Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor
and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L. J. 353, 412 (1989). Zeppos discussed judicial
candor, and concluded that there was not enough knowledge about the judicial process to
assert a call for judicial candor. A deeper understanding of the motivations and intentions
of the judiciary is necessary to understand the depth and success of the above restrictions.
This is an area poised for future research in public choice. See also MUELLER, supra note
23, at 401 (noting that the motivation of judges “remains largely an empty black box in
the public choice literature”).
147
See supra Part IIIA.
148
See supra note 137 and corresponding text.
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2. Stare Decisis
Stare decisis is important in light of Arrow’s consequences for
jurisprudential theory. Alexander Hamilton wrote of a predicted
“feebleness” of the judiciary relative to the other branches because the
judiciary should not exert “force of will” to create laws in sufficient
number to do damage.149 Expecting judges to be tied down by precedent,
Hamilton found less reason to worry about judicial tyranny.150
But judges are not “tied down” by the “application” of precedent, as
Chief Justice Roberts offers, since that application cannot result from an
objective tool.151 To believe otherwise is to incorrectly presume that
group-decision limitations are non-existent. Ignorance of the Arrovian
failure may lead to a view that an objective application of law seems to
support stare decisis theory. Discovering the failure may rock one’s faith
in adjudication, and may taint perception of federal judges who are
nearly absolved of restraints after they are appointed.152 When properly
internalizing the capacity of the courts, there is no objective way to show
the “correct” interpretation; therefore no interpretation is completely
wrong or right.
Consequently, because there is no possible way to determine an
objectively correct outcome in communal interpretation, there should be
no expectation of legitimate interpretation stemming from an objective
application of consistent case law. It follows that since there can be no
one “right” interpretation,153 then appellate courts can offer nothing more
149

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
151
See supra note 1.
152
“A federal judge can be lazy, lack judicial temperament, mistreat his staff, berate
without reason the lawyers who appear before him, be reprimanded for ethical lapses,
verge on or even slide into senility, be continually reversed for elementary legal mistakes,
hold under advisement for years cases that could be decided perfectly well in days or
weeks, leak confidential information to the press, pursue a nakedly political agenda, and
misbehave in other ways that might get even a tenured civil servant or university
professor fired; he will retain his office.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 111
(Harvard University Press 1995). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
108 (2001) (citing multiple statements by the trial court judge regarding his “distaste for
the defense of technological integration,” while commenting on Bill Gates’ business
ethics failings, and an overall bias against the defendant).
153
Such subjective decisions may be cases involving fundamental rights. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (finding certain rights to abortion
protected under Constitution—“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574
(2003) (adopting the language of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, finding adult consensual
conduct protected by Constitution); S. Burlington County. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel,
92 N.J. 158 (1983) (encouraging a municipality to require a developer to set aside 20% of
150

2008]

Applying the Rule of Law Subjectively

359

than debates about which argument is more persuasive than another. The
courts, at best, vacillate on the bell curve of “reasonable judges
interpreting reasonably,” and continuing discussion ensues rather than
rote algorithms. Appellate courts are thus never objectively nor
concretely applying stare decisis; they only create a reasonable
interpretation of precedent.
Judge Easterbrook has argued that precedent “cuts down on
idiosyncratic conclusions by subjecting each judge’s work to a test of
congruence with conclusions of those confronting the same problem.”154
This may be true, but it only indicates that an appellate court is signaling
the course of future cases to future litigants. Lawyers may internalize the
facts of cases to make predictions, but there is no application of objective
criteria.
Easterbrook also claims that stare decisis will create “path
dependence”—the phenomenon of arbitrary factual predicates
developing the law.155 This idea should be dismissed if it is posed as an
objective control, because each case includes a re-interpretation of
previous cases. Judges “bargain” over former meanings. In other words,
they alter outcomes using intensity preference to “fix” the effect of
specific precedents, perhaps by “distinguishing” them, thus avoiding the
path dependence problem.156 Stated another way, there can be no path
dependence when there is no objective rule of law applied. Even the
proposed housing units for “inclusionary,” as opposed to exclusionary, purposes, under
state constitutional substantive due process and equal protection grounds).
154
Frank M. Easterbrook, The Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law
and Public Policy: The Crisis in Legal Theory and The Revival of Classical
Jurisprudence: Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV 422,
423 (1988).
155
Id. at 426 (stating that “[n]o sound system of law allows such fundamental
questions to turn solely on the order in which cases arrive for decision—but stare decisis
could do so unless tempered”).
156
Many commentators agree there is a path dependence problem. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 786 n.150 (1993) (“A strong theory of stare decisis,
combined with commitment to analogical thinking, may alleviate some of the cycling
problems and this produce greater stability in law, but it will be difficult to achieve real
coherence through decentralized, multimember courts. . . . [A]nalogical reasoning [may]
diminish cycling; but the problem of path dependence will result in a high degree of
arbitrariness.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (“The fact that a court in a
rather simple case . . . could face a choice between two voting protocols, each of which
seems quite reasonable . . . yet discover that the outcome of the case will turn on the
choice between them, is the product of a structural paradox latent in appellate
adjudication.”). Kornhauser and Sager suggest that a multimember court should first ask
how it should collectively decide the case in light of the complexities of issues versus
outcome voting. Id. at 30. The authors conclude that at times multimember courts should
adopt issue-by-issue voting. Otherwise, arbitrary identities and personal beliefs of any
particular judge will be overly important. Id. at 38.
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seemingly “black letter law” cases must always be bargained for using
the cardinal tool of the intensity of conviction.
In conclusion, many people, including judges, expect courts to
simply “apply” stare decisis in a case, or perhaps at the very least not
suffer from choosing among an open array of irreconcilable yet equally
plausible terms in every single case. Appellate decisions inherently carry
a limitation controverting the assumed legitimacy and purported strength
of stare decisis, if that strength derives from a legal “application.”
Hamilton’s Federalist Papers argument may be best: the efficacy of
judges and stare decisis depends on the reasonable, and security for
liberties rests ultimately in “public opinion, and on the general spirit of
the people and of the government.”157 Paraphrasing Hart, reasonable
judges make decisions about how legislators and judges are reasonable
persons seeking reasonable purposes, reasonably.158 The description
captures the essence of jurisprudential stare decisis.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article examines the impact of Arrow’s proof on appellate
jurisprudence. It considers whether the current understanding of the
interaction between legislatures and the judiciary is correct—specifically
within the multimember courts. The Article first reviewed Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem, and then applied Arrow to legislatures to reach
the conclusion that legislative intent is critical to the liberal project’s
Rule of Law.
Legislative intent is not precluded by Arrow’s Theorem, which is
an important realization in the analysis of the relationship between the
judiciary and the legislature. The legislature does not necessarily carry
the roots of the judiciary’s failure to apply the law. The Article argues
that appellate courts cannot ordinally rank preferences to decide cases,
but must bargain to perform statutory interpretation. Ordinal rankings
demand a dictator, but the Article proves how the dictator problem is
solved with cardinal preference ordering which relaxes the Independence
axiom. The Article then demonstrates that cardinal bargaining is a
necessary precursor for legislative intent and functions as a
jurisprudential contradiction in the judiciary for the liberal project’s Rule
of Law.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). The desire to create “legitimacy”
restricts judges on an individual basis. Judges must mind their acts because “beyond
comparison [the judiciary is] the weakest of the three departments of power . . . [and] all
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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This result seems to contradict a “purist” view of the Rule of Law.
Vote-trading, strategizing, or bargaining over the precious Rule of Law
seems beneath the conduct of appellate judges, and more like activity in
a sausage factory.159 However, relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives axiom is not just practical, but also the only axiom that may
be relaxed in multimember courts. This method sustains fidelity to
majority rule in the decision-making process, providing an avenue for
adjudication of cases. The realization should not shatter assumptions of
predictability desired in the Rule of Law. Rather, it explains what
functions appellate courts may be fit to fulfill and where they will fail. If
mere finality is desirable, then allowing appellate courts to interpret
regulations provides greater potential for individuals to internalize
expectations of how courts in the future would treat similar legal issues.
Unpredictability remains, but future potential parties internalize this so
settlements may occur within range of unpredictable outcomes.
Alternatively, if society expects appellate courts to avoid political
morality judgments in all cases, the expectation is irrational. The only
workable expectation is that political power must be wielded by judges,
and is not objectively “applied.”
Without some sort of cardinal bargain, incoherence is inevitable—
the judiciary’s interpretation of statutes would be arbitrary with
inconclusive adjudications punctuated by random failures of the majority
rule. Consequently, the law would develop in an irrational, piecemeal
manner.160 However, this does not occur.
The existence of the conflict between objectivity and political
power is confirmed by this Article. However, bargaining should not be
considered hidden, secretive, or invidious—and is certainly not “wrong.”
It is necessary and thus “acceptable,” notwithstanding fears of
“nihilism.” Interpreting G. Calabresi, the search for truth should trump
fears that the foundation for the rule of law is upon gossamer cables. This
is the task when looking in jurisprudence’s “dark corners.”161
The result of an Arrovian analysis applied to decision-making in
appellate courts reveals that the most controversial cases in law are
159

“I have seen sausage being made (for two summers, when I worked my way
through college by working the graveyard shift at a meat packing plant), and I have seen
the [Supreme] Court make law. It is not like making sausage. Instead, our system of
Constitutional liberties, protected by our state and federal courts, has made us the envy of
the world. The newly emerging democracies seek to emulate our legal system, and our
greatest export has become our Bill of Rights.” 7 RONALD ROTUNDA, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v (7th ed. Supp. 2005).
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ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
xi (Amy Gutmann ed,, Princeton University Press 1997).
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Calabresi, G., Letter, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 23 (1985).
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problematic and predictably irreconcilable, if not seemingly hypocritical,
but there is a mathematical reason for this. The reason for inconsistency
is not necessarily insincerity or deceit by judges, nor even some
contemptible strategy by those who appoint them. Rather, institutional
limitations exist in the communal procedures of group decision-making
in the courts.
The subjective determinations of appellate court judges control the
direction of stare decisis, which manifests in contracts among judges
between themselves and with their future replacements. Yet the
legitimacy of stare decisis does not result from an “application” of law
because that application is impossible. This latter aspect may seem
strange, but nevertheless must be accepted as fact. Chief Justice Roberts
does not “apply” law. Likewise, the Article’s introductory quotes from
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and Judge and Professor Bork are
hortatory refrains; their principles are not “apply-able” either.
Legislative bargaining, and thus the non-existence of the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption in the legislature,
enables the creation of laws. Judicial bargaining, and the same nonexistence of the Independence assumption in appellate courts, enables
adjudications. Appellate court judges make decisions based on personal
perceptions of the best arguments and rhetoric available in a case. While
subjective authority is required in judicial decisions, bargains are also
necessary because Dworkin’s reputed Herculean decision-maker does
not exist and is never appointed to rule. This Article relates how Arrow’s
proof reveals the theoretical problems in jurisprudence, but also
illuminates how Arrow influences the process of appellate adjudication.

